Montana Business Quarterly, Summer 1963 by Montana State University (Missoula, Mont.). Bureau of Business and Economic Research
T p j ^  ARCHIVES




BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC BESEAECH 
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY, MISSOULA

m o n m n n
B U S i n E S S




Published quarterly by the
BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY, MISSOULA
Paul B. Blomgren, Dean and Director 
Maxine C. Johnson, Assistant Director
The views and opinions in the Business Quarterly are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the School or the Uni 
versity.
Subscriptions, $4.00 per year; single copy price, $1.00.
Entered as second-class matter March 3, 1949, at the Post Office 
at Missoula, Montana, under the Act of August 24, 1912.

In This Issue
About the A u th o rs .................................................................5
From the Director’s D e s k ....................................................7
PAUL B. BLOMGREN
Educational Opportunities in the Forty-First State . . 13 
FRANK C. ABBOTT
Bankruptcy Causes and Remedies—Part 1 . . . . . .  24
NORMAN E. TAYLOR
Bankruptcy Causes and Remedies—Part I I .................... 49
GEORGE L. MITCHELL




Frank C. Abbott is Academic Vice President and, at this 
time, Acting President of Montana State University. Dr. Abbott 
received his A.B. from Cornell University with a major in 
government. He holds a Master of Public Administration de 
gree from Cornell and a Ph.D. in political economy and govern 
ment from Harvard University.
Dr. Abbott has served as Administrative Assistant in the Pro 
vost’s Office and as Administrative Assistant to the President, 
Cornell University, 1946-1949. From 1951 through 1958, he was 
a Staff Associate, American Council on Education in Wash 
ington, D.C. Dr. Abbott was Assistant Dean of the University 
and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bucknell Uni 
versity from 1958 until he became Academic Vice President at 
M.S.U. in February, 1961. He was appointed Acting President 
in July, 1963.
Since 1946, Frank Abbott has been actively concerned with 
problems of higher education on a national as well as regional 
and local levels. Drawing from this broad background, he 
spoke to the Ravalli County Improvement Association concern 
ing higher education in Montana last spring. His article on 
p. 13 in this issue is based upon that discussion.
Robert F. Wallace is Professor of Economics and Chairman 
of the Department of Economics at M.S.U. He holds A.B. and 
M.A. degrees (with a major in economics) from the Univer 
sity of Kansas. His Ph.D. degree in economics is from the Uni 
versity of Minnesota. Dr. Wallace has taught at the University 
of Kansas, Park College, University of Minnesota and, from 
1947-61, Washington State University. He has been Visiting 
Professor at the University of Punjab (Pakistan) and at Michi 
gan State University. He joined the Montana State University 
faculty in 1961.
Dr. Wallace has been Regional Business Consultant for the
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Kansas City District of the U.S. Department of Commerce; 
Consultant to the President, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; 
Consultant to the Director of U.S. A.I.D., Ceylon; Economist 
for the Central Intelligence Agency and currently represents 
this agency on the M.S.U. campus. During 1962 he led a study 
and discussion group of Missoula businessmen in the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce course on the “American Competitive 
Enterprise System.” He is a member of the American Eco 
nomic Association and the American Finance Association.
Among Dr. Wallace’s publications, readers interested in his 
present article “What Everybody Wants to Know About Deficit 
Spending” on p. 60 might also enjoy “The Federal Debt and 
Inflation,” The Bulletin of the National Tax Association, June 
1947; “Some Reflections on Current War Financing,” The Jour 
nal of Finance, September 1951; “Use of the Progressive Dis 
count Rate by the Federal Reserve System,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, February 1956.
Mr. George L. Mitchell is Instructor in Business Administra 
tion at Montana State University. Mr. Mitchell received his 
Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Arizona, with 
a major in English and a minor in political science. In 1962, 
he received his LL.B. degree from the Montana State Univer 
sity School of Law and was admitted to the bar in Montana. 
Mr. Mitchell joined the faculty of the School of Business 
Administration in 1962. His primary fields are law and gov 
ernment regulation.
Background data on Norman Taylor appears in the Mon 
tana Business Quarterly, Winter 1963.
This issue brings to a close the first year of publication for the 
Montana Business Quarterly. We have been highly pleased 
with the response to the new publication. The critical com 
ments have been particularly appreciated since we frankly 
admit that the publication is in the process of development. 
Constructive criticism forces us to reevaluate what we are 
doing and why. This urges us to develop processes and for 
mats. As a growing and developing publication, we do not want 
to become static, but it seems that this is both the time and 
the place to indicate what we are trying to do as we now see it 
and to explain some of the questions which have been raised 
during the course of this first year.
The basic premise behind the publication of the Quarterly 
is to make available material concerning the Montana econ 
omy and Montana business so that the citizens of the state 
may be well informed. A second purpose is to present articles 
which we feel would be of interest and value to the business 
men of the state. This, of course, gives a scope much more 
broad than if we limited it to articles concerned only with busi 
ness. It also provides an opportunity for faculty outside the 
School of Business Administration to write for the general
i
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public of the state. This opportunity is lacking in some academic 
areas where there is no publication available with general 
statewide circulation. However, we always attempt to have at 
least one article pertaining to business in each issue.
Having established the basic premise concerning the Quar 
terly and its scope, what are the criteria we use in determining 
whether or not to publish a specific article? First, the article 
must treat the subject matter in a thoughtful and thought- 
provoking manner. Facts and figures used in the article must 
be documented as to source so that interested readers may pur 
sue them further or make judgments as to the reliability of the 
source material. Statements of conclusion must be reasonably 
supported by the facts presented or be a logical possible result 
of the reasoning presented. The article may not use an emo 
tional approach to the problem. In short, the approach, treat 
ment, and tone of the article must.be as serious as possible.
Second, the articles must be readable, with a minimum of 
technical terms. These articles are written for the general pub 
lic rather than an academic audience in the writer’s profes 
sional field. Hence, we try to eliminate technical terms and 
jargon if they can possibly be avoided. If technical terms must 
be used, they should be defined so that a reader will not be 
lost in a maze of special language. In these pages the writers 
try to communicate as precisely as possible with our readers.
One question is bound to arise when we consider a particular 
article. Suppose the author reaches a conclusion which might 
not be popular with a segment of our readers — should such 
an article be published? By far the easiest decision is to say no. 
By rejecting controversial material we can probably avoid 
criticism. But that means we must be acquainted with every 
conclusion which might prove to be unpopular with any seg 
ment of our readers — an obvious impossibility. More impor 
tant, it seems to us that we do not fulfill our responsibility to 
the citizens of Montana unless we do, in fact, expose them to 
differing points of view, provided the article meets the two cri 
teria previously explained. In fact, we believe that the great 
majority of our readers would like the opportunity to study dif 
ferent points of view presented in the most tightly reasoned and 
objective manner possible.
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Over the past year we have provided our readers with arti 
cles of varying viewpoint and subject matter; not an easy 
task when one considers that articles such as these take from 
two to three months of a faculty member’s spare time to write 
and polish. (Frequently we have been promised an article only 
to find the faculty member concerned has been compelled to lay 
the work aside because of a more pressing assignment.) Some 
articles are presented to us without much advance notice as to 
topic and content. We normally publish them when presented, 
achieving balance when we can.
Thus, as a part of a commitment to the presentation of differ 
ing points of view, we do our utmost to achieve a balanced pres 
entation. However, our readers must have a little patience and 
faith as it will take us a little time to make good our commit 
ment.
One other pertinent point should be discussed as we assess 
the first year of publication. When we laid down basic prem 
ises, it was pointed out that we felt obligated to present the 
citizens of Montana with the basic facts about the Montana 
economy as impartially as we know how. This is the responsi 
bility of the Director and from time to time he is aided, at his 
request, by the Assistant Director. Since both of us are deeply 
concerned with Montana’s future we are naturally discouraged 
when the picture is not as glowing as we would like. However, 
we believe that satisfactory growth cannot be achieved until 
Montana squarely faces the economic facts of life and begins 
to progress from there.
In connection with this aspect of the Quarterly, we’ve been 
asked why we continually use figures covering a ten or twelve 
year span, instead of working just from year to year. Agricul 
ture, mining, lumbering, and construction have been extremely 
important factors to the economy of Montana. By their very 
nature these segments of the economy can fluctuate widely 
from year to year. For example, a severe drought can cause a 
wide fluctuation in agricultural income, as can a good year 
accompanied by a sharp price increase. As a result, the year 
to year agricultural figures tend to present a distorted picture. 
The use of a ten or twelve year period, using all of the years 
in the period instead of selected years, makes it possible to
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observe trends. This is the material we feel most obligated to 
present, because it is not usually available elsewhere.
We are also frequently asked why, when we cite figures on 
Montana economy, we usually avoid many statistics about the 
current year, particularly those available from some popular 
sources. The primary reason for avoiding them is that they are 
very likely to be revised several times before the final figures 
are published. Some of these estimates may deviate consider 
ably from the final figure — a fact which makes their use con 
fusing. For example, one source estimates personal income by 
months; in 1961 there was an original estimate plus a first and 
second revision for each month as well as for the year. The 
difference in the original estimate from the second revision 
ranged from 5.0 percent in the August figure to 9.4 percent in 
the November figure. In each case the original estimate was 
higher than the final figure. The original estimate for the year 
was 7.8 percent higher than the final figure. This same publica 
tion has an excellent record for accuracy in most other states. 
However, in a state with a relatively sparse population and a 
primarily raw material economy such as Montana, the diffi 
culties of making an accurate monthly estimate are stagger 
ing. Instead of leaving these few states out, the publication 
feels it is necessary to make the estimates in the best possible 
manner under the circumstances. Montana Business Quarterly 
does not make such an attempt because we feel that possible 
inaccuracies are more misleading than using a number of statis 
tics covering the current year which would have to be revised 
later.
The way in which we present the picture of the economy has 
caused some of our readers to believe that we have no faith 
in the Montana economy or in the long run prospects for the 
state. This is an incorrect conclusion, though admittedly it 
could be drawn by those who do not grasp our long range 
intentions. We believe that Montana has good prospects — pros 
pects which can best be developed when they are based upon 
a thorough and honest appraisal of our problems and needs.
Thus, as we assess the first year of publication of the Mon 
tana Business Quarterly, we are pleased, but far from satis 
fied. We are pleased because of the highly favorable response
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received not only within Montana, but from various parts of 
the country. We believe the Quarterly is better than its prede 
cessor, the Montana Business Review. We are dissatisfied be 
cause we see a great deal of room for improvement. With the 
help of “constructive criticism” from our readers and constant 
reevaluation by our staff, we are firmly resolved to make Mon 
tana Business Quarterly a growing and improving publication, 




In the Forty-First State
FRANK C. ABBOTT 
Acting President 
Montana State University 
Missoula, Montana
It is a peculiar fact that while Americans in 1963 are prob 
ably shaped more significantly by education than by any other 
social force, we take for granted the virtues of our educational 
system and too often fail to probe deeply for understanding of 
its problems and limitations.
One could present all kinds of evidence concerning the im 
portance of education in the contemporary world. As a dean 
I have been impressed by the faith that young people and par 
ents, too, place in a college degree. Of course, this faith is 
supported by cold facts. At the turn of the present century 
only 18 percent of the labor force wore white collars in profes 
sional, managerial, clerical, sales and other comparable endeav 
ors; by 1960 the figure was 42 percent, an astounding change 
in the basic composition of the labor force in a little over half 
a century. Moreover, from 1947 to 1962, while the total labor 
force grew by some 10 million workers, the number of white 
collar workers grew by 9.7 million — 97 percent of the total. 
The increase in professional and technical workers has been 
the largest in any employment category; and in the decade 
ahead it is expected that this group will increase more than 
twice as fast as the average increase for all fields of work. 
Since 1900, the proportion of farm workers has declined dra 
matically, and “blue collar” workers have remained a relatively 
stable proportion of the labor force.1 The striking thing is the
’Superintendent of Documents, U.S.G.P.O., Manpower Report of the 
President . . . Transmitted to the Congress March 1963, pp. 26, 100, and 
Table G-5 (p. 201).
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growth in the proportion of white collar workers, persons hold 
ing positions which typically require more than an average 
education and in a great many cases, advanced education of a 
high order.
Another measure of the importance that we place on educa 
tion is the fact that more public funds are spent on education in 
this country than for any other public purpose except national 
defense. So far as state and local governmental activity is con 
cerned, in 1961 education represented 37 percent of all state 
and local expenditures.2 Nationally, expenditures for public 
and private education in 1960 amounted to more than $25 billion 
or 5.0 percent of gross national product — more than one third 
more than the share of the gross national product which went 
to education in 1950.3 In terms of dollars, this indicates a very 
substantial commitment to education.
One could cite other indications of the importance of educ- 
cation today — the impressive march of science into all areas 
of human experience; the advance of automation and its impli 
cations for education; the growing complexity of international 
and interpersonal relationships and the ominous difficulty of 
finding ways to live together in peace. However, there is broad 
agreement on the importance of education, so with this brief 
backdrop as to the role of education in our society, let us con 
sider more specifically the status of educational opportunity in 
the forty-first state — the state of Montana, forty-first to enter 
the Union and thus a relatively young state, and a vigorous one.
First of all, how are we doing with regard to education in 
relation to our sister states, older or younger? It seems we 
are doing reasonably well; indeed very well in some respects. 
Nearly half of all Montana residents (47.8 percent) have four 
or more years of high school education, versus a national aver 
age of 41.1 percent; and in this respect Montana leads such 
states as Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and many 
others.4 Seven and five-tenths percent of our people have four
“National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1963, (Wash 
ington, D.C., 1963), Table 78.
“American Council on Education, Office of Statistical Information and 
Research, A Fact Book on Higher Education, Tables 137, 232.
^National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1963, Table 45.
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years of college against a national average of 7.7 percent, so 
we are slightly under the average in this regard just as we are 
considerably above it with respect to high school.5 Another 
indication that we are doing well is that Montana consistently 
stands near the top among the states in the percent of Selective 
Service registrants who pass the Selective Service mental test. 
In 1961, for example, the most recent year reported, our record 
was narrowly beaten by only three states — Utah, Washington, 
and Wyoming.6
In terms of effort in behalf of education as measured by 
tax collections, tax dollars spent for education, average support 
per pupil, and like indicators, Montana has reason for pride. 
Though in personal income in 1961 we stood 32nd (more than 
10 percent below the U.S. average), in per capita state and local 
expenditures for all public education we were 12th among the 
50 states, well above the national average; and in total state 
and local tax collections as a percentage of personal income 
that same year we stood second in the nation.7 In short, though 
our tax resources are below average, our state and local effort 
in behalf of public education is decidedly above average. The 
Montana fiscal commitment to education is impressive.
On more strictly academic measures, elementary and secon 
dary education in the forty-first state stand up very well in 
some respects. Montana was fifth in the nation in 1961 in what 
we call the pupil-teacher ratio — the number of pupils for 
each teacher. Against a U.S. ratio of 25.6 pupils per teacher, in 
Montana we had one teacher for each 21.5 pupils. Montana also 
ranks well in attendance ratios; in 1960-61, we led all the states 
with an average of 96.5 percent of our youngsters in school 
daily.8 This top-level performance was an extremely fine show 
ing, especially considering the distances some of our children 
have to go to school and the nature of our winters.
Realism compels us to recognize that our favorable standing 
in the pupil-teacher ratio, and perhaps our strong attendance 
record are partly a result of having schools, often small schools,
6Ibid., Table 46.
"Ibid., Table 48.
'Ibid., Tables 49, 77, 63.
"Ibid., Table 38; Rankings of the States, 1961, Table 17.
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relatively near our communities, in some cases at the cost of 
operating a more efficient-sized school that would have to be 
somewhat farther away. The fact that we have many small 
schools is not in itself necessarily a sign of either weakness or 
strength. However, we do have an extraordinary number of 
small schools in Montana.
During this past school year, roughly 675 of our 782 elemen 
tary school districts (86 percent) employed four or fewer teach 
ers. Ninety-four of our 169 high schools (56 percent) enrolled 
fewer than 125 pupils (in grades 9-12) and only forty of our 
high schools had more than 200 students.9 We may contrast 
this fact with the considered view of Dr. J. B. Conant, who 
urges that a school with one hundred students in the graduat 
ing class represents the smallest size economically practicable 
for a diverse program to meet the interests and capabilities 
of diverse students.10
The small school, perhaps especially the small high school, 
does pose some hard problems for Montana. The demands that 
our times place upon our entire educational system have borne 
down with special force upon the high schools; demands for 
mathematics, science, foreign languages, English composition 
and literature and other “college-preparatory” subjects are 
greater than they were only a few years ago. Part of this results 
from the pressures on the colleges to step up their own require 
ments and attainments. Partly, though, it results from the fact 
that a much higher proportion of high school students today are 
college-bound than was the case only a decade or two ago. 
When only one in ten or even one in five high school students 
went to college, the high school naturally had a major concern 
with the 9 in 10, or 4 in 5, who did not. Today in the nation and 
in Montana, roughly 4 out of each 10 high school-age young 
sters go on to college, and substantially more than that intend 
to do so and therefore seek to prepare themselves for it. Be 
cause well-qualified teachers of mathematics and science and 
languages and indeed, of any subject, are hard to come by and
"Data supplied by Bureau of Educational Research, Montana State 
University.
'“James B. Conant, The American High School Today (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), pp. 14, 37-38, 77-80.
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command relatively high salaries, our high schools, and espe 
cially our small high schools, face increasingly acute problems.
Acknowledging both achievements and problems of our ele 
mentary and secondary schools and the certainty that careful 
planning will be needed to retain the strengths and overcome 
the limitations, how about Montana colleges? Here too, as with 
regard to public education generally, the forty-first state has 
done extremely well in some important respects.
First of all, higher educational opportunity in Montana is 
remarkably open and available to all. This is true in part be 
cause of the wise policy of giving any Montana high school 
graduate an opportunity to discover, and to demonstrate to 
others, whether he or she has what it takes to succeed in col 
lege. Under the impact of rising enrollments a number of states 
that formerly admitted any high school graduate to the state 
colleges have set entrance requirements of one kind or another, 
including mental tests which are supposed to decide between 
those who are qualified and those who are not. While I am not 
an expert on testing, I am familiar enough with the considered 
judgments of test experts to know that no test has been or can 
be ever devised which will tell us whether a youngster has 
what it takes to succeed in college as accurately as an oppor 
tunity for that youngster to demonstrate this in action.
In addition, state support in Montana has been provided in 
an amount intended to keep student fees and other costs at a 
relatively modest level. Our fees and board and room costs 
are not low compared to other state universities, but neither 
are they excessively high.11 Taken together with our “open 
door” policy on admissions, the cost structure helps give Mon 
tana youth an opportunity for higher education that probably 
is unsurpassed in this country.
Furthermore, Montana has provided a good spread of edu 
cational opportunity, both geographically and by type of edu 
cational program. Six units in this large state are spread from 
Billings to Havre to Missoula and Dillon where everything 
may be learned from A to Z — from Agriculture to Zoology — 
well, not quite everything, but a very great deal!
"American Council on Education, Office of Statistical Information and 
Research, op. cit., Table 220.
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And to offer opportunity both to young people, and to the 
Montana public which depends upon the services of highly 
trained professional people, there is an interstate program in I 
which Montana participates — WICHE, the Western Interstate ( 
Commission on Higher Education — through which a number 
of Montana youth are aided in the study of medicine and den 
tistry and veterinary medicine at universities in other states. 
These are schools that are extremely costly to build and to 
operate; schools which Montana need not finance at this time, 
thanks to the opportunity it buys through WICHE.
It should be emphasized that Montana has built educational 
programs selectively in the six units of the University. As 
recently as October 1962, in the Master Plan the State Board 
of Regents reaffirmed the historic policy of the Legislature 
and the Board that there shall be differentiation of function 
among the several units. This policy means that, for example, 
agriculture and electrical or civil engineering will be offered 
at Bozeman and not, in the present decade at least, in Missoula 
or elsewhere; and that law and pharmacy, as examples, will 
be at Missoula and not at Bozeman. Of course there are numer 
ous fundamental disciplines and even professional programs 
(like education) in which some degree of duplication is neces 
sary, either because of the importance of the field in a college 
education or because of the extent of needs of the state.
It is obvious that it costs more to offer the same programs in 
several institutions than to assign programs to the several units 
selectively, in accordance with their central objectives. Some 
duplication among units is inevitable. The aim has been to 
keep it to a desirable minimum. With Montana’s limited base 
of population and fiscal capacity it seems evident that this 
historic policy of differentiation has had a great deal to do 
with the fact that the state has built a university system of 
which we can be proud, not only because of the factors already 
cited but because this system is doing a high-quality job.
Let me support this assertion of quality with two quick but 
telling sets of facts relevant to MSU. The most recent figures 
available indicate that in all state universities in the country,
47.6 percent of the faculty hold the doctor’s degree; whereas 
at MSU, 55.3 percent hold this degree, an extremely signifi-
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cant fact.12 Second, the library collection at MSU is an out 
standing one. Data from the Executive Secretary of the Uni 
versity of Montana indicate that the 265,000 volumes at MSU 
(excluding U.S. government documents) represent a better per 
student book collection than at any state university in Colo 
rado, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, or Wyo 
ming.13 These evidences of quality reflect effort and achieve 
ment over a period of years. Such attainments are not provided 
for overnight.
From the picture thus far sketched it seems evident that 
Montanans have reason both for pride in their educational sys 
tem and for a degree of optimism. All things considered, edu 
cational opportunity is in good shape in the forty-first state. 
This state of affairs has been bought at considerable cost; evi 
dently Montana residents and taxpayers have long thought 
their investment in education to be wise. But how about the 
future? Larger numbers of children born since the war are 
now in the high schools and approaching the university, and 
with all the pressures upon our educational system from out 
side the state, can Montana maintain its strong position of 
educational quality in the years ahead?
Doubtless it can, but there are numerous pitfalls in the way. 
I have already referred to the pressures for upgrading teaching 
in all areas of elementary and secondary education, and to 
some of the costs we must be prepared to contend with in return 
for the privilege of maintaining small schools, close to our com 
munities.
The first point I would make with respect to higher educa 
tion is that quality is defined and determined not only by what 
we in Montana do, but by persons, groups, and developments 
throughout this country and the world.
Factors outside the forty-first state affect the quality of the 
students we have. Many of Montana’s most promising young 
people are bid away from us with scholarships offered by fine 
institutions as far away as Boston, Philadelphia, and Los An-
iaUniversity of Montana System of Higher Education, Master Plan Study,
Status Report, February 1, 1963, p. 20.
"Memorandum to Unit Presidents and Institutional Studies Officers,
January 7, 1963.
20 MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY
geles. For example, one public university in an agricultural 
state in the Midwest last year offered 1,175 opportunities for 
graduate studies with stipends ranging from $300 to $2,500, plus 
exemption from the non-resident fee. We all know students 
from our high schools who have gone to colleges outside the 
state on undergraduate scholarships. We can keep some of these 
able young people only by providing quality education in our 
own state.
Factors outside Montana affect the quality and the cost of 
our faculty, too. We seek the well-qualified person who is inter 
ested in us at the price -we can afford to pay, wherever he may 
be. And so do colleges and universities throughout the nation. 
In consequence, the marketplace for faculty members is na 
tional and even international in scope. At MSU we have re 
cently employed men from as far as the University of Toronto 
and the University of Vienna. Last year the approximately 
three dozen persons who were employed at MSU as replace 
ments or as additions to meet increased enrollments came from 
16 states, the District of Columbia, and four foreign countries. 
The salaries we pay are necessarily determined by the com 
petition we must meet outside this state. The people who left 
us last year to take positions in other institutions have earned 
on the average 34 percent more than they would have received 
at MSU. Pressure mounts under competition from outside. 
Our marvelous countryside does have some holding power, 
but we cannot fall behind our competition in salary levels with 
out losing the very teachers who lend distinction and quality 
to our institutions.
Finally, we must recognize that standards for what is excel 
lent in higher education are determined by forces outside this 
state. Most people know of the “accrediting associations” and 
their standards. However, these regional and national associa 
tions exert less potent influences than the accomplishments 
of scholars and scientists throughout the country and through 
out the world with whom our scholars and scientists must 
keep up, and to whose scholarship our people must contribute, 
if we are to be in the same league. The quality of our educa 
tional achievements will be measured in terms of science and
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scholarship which knows no boundaries either state or na 
tional.
In the face of the fact that the quality of our Montana system 
will in essence be determined by forces and standards estab- 
’ lished outside the state, we should take sober notice of needs 
and developments in Montana, especially in two interrelated 
areas.
One of these is the certain need for the further development 
of graduate work in the two multipurpose units, MSU and 
MSC. Student demand for graduate study is increasing very 
rapidly in virtually all fields. Though we have heard more 
about the “tidal wave” of undergraduates, since World War II 
graduate enrollments in the U.S. have been rising much more 
rapidly than undergraduate enrollments.1-1 In many fields today 
one cannot obtain responsible employment, one cannot per 
form a professional role, without one or more years of graduate 
or advanced professional study. Further, in more and more 
fields graduate students are an important factor in faculty 
research and scholarship, which in turn are critical factors in 
attracting and retaining the kind of superior faculty we must 
have. The necessary growth of graduate study would not be 
so sobering a prospect if it were not a fact that it is several 
I times as costly as most undergraduate instruction.
The second need, related to the first, is the natural urge for■
every unit in the Montana University System to aspire to 
become a full-fledged university. We readily acknowledge this 
aspiration in Missoula; we think the people of Montana have 
expected us to have that aspiration, and grasp the importance 
I of a quickened sense of it, now. We should expect our colleagues 
in Bozeman to acknowledge this aspiration too, and for the 
same reason. Elsewhere in the state — at Billings, Butte, Dillon 
and Havre — there is no expectation of becoming another 
“Berkeley” immediately. However, the urge to grow is there 
because growth appears as an avenue to broader and deeper, 
and therefore better, educational programs. Eastern Montana 
College of Education has proposed that it be authorized to
"Bernard Berelson, Graduate Education in the United States (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 32, 101.
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offer liberal arts degrees. MSC has been proposing for several 
years that it be authorized to offer the B.A. degree in English, 
history and economics.15 Name-change proposals for five of the 
six University units were aired in the last Legislature, reflect 
ing actual or proposed developments in educational program. 
Our aspiration-level in Montana is high.
If we are to avoid building on quick-sand in response to 
these aspirations, we had better give careful attention to some 
hard facts. Our level of personal income per capita falls below 
the national average. Furthermore, in the last decade the in 
crease in per capita personal income in Montana was less than 
in any of the United States with a single exception, and our 
expenditures per pupil in average daily attendance increased 
less than in 46 of the other states. While our increase in that 
decade was 46.1 percent, 46 states increased their per pupil 
expenditures more than we did.16
We need to be aware of the very real practical limitations 
within which we work. There are as many square miles in 
Montana as in the six New England states plus New York 
and most of Pennsylvania — and two percent as many people. 
Our population in all of Montana barely rivals that of down 
town Pittsburgh, a city which does not support even one public 
college or university.
Montana is a wonderful place to live, to raise a family, to 
educate the children. Montanans feel deeply about opportunity 
for education at all levels — elementary, secondary, and higher. 
Against somewhat limited economic resources, Montana citi 
zens are already taxing themselves relatively more heavily 
than most U.S. citizens to provide good schools and colleges. 
We have been able to achieve a high level of quality in our 
college and university programs because we have assigned 
distinctive functions to the several units, have minimized 
duplication of offerings and have concentrated graduate work 
at MSU and MSC. In the years ahead there will be, as there 
have been in the past, severe pressures to expand rapidly in
’“See Montana State College, Master Plan Report, December 1961, p. 40.
'"National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1963, Tables 50, 
83.
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some University of Montana units into areas already available 
in others. These pressures will come in the name of extending 
“educational opportunity” for the young people of the locality 
concerned and of the state.
But “educational opportunity” is made up both of access to 
a school and of quality of the offering. The one without the 
other is of no value. The quality we are able to achieve will be 
determined by our response to factors that are national and 
international in scope, factors over which Montanans have 
relatively little control.
In Montana in the past we have had a large measure of both 
access and quality, by virtue of some hard choices and rigor 
ous limitation of programs. In Montana in the future we can 
retain both access and quality by the same kind of informed 
and intelligent choices. In the light of sober economic facts, 
we can retain both access and quality only through such 
choices.
PART I
Bankruptcy Causes and Remedies
NORMAN E. TAYLOR
Associate Professor of Business Administration 
Montana State University, Missoula
Let9s Go Bankrupt!.
The jocular title above seems to be the rallying cry for more 
and more Americans. What used to be a grave family tragedy 
now appears to be regarded as a routine, pragmatic financial 
adjustment. Apparently there is no longer any social or eco 
nomic stigma connected with the public confession that a per 
son cannot (or will not) pay his bills.
The idea of bankruptcy goes far back into history. It has 
taken such forms as “imprisoning the debtor’s person in 
chains, subjecting him to stripes and hard labor, at the mercy 
of his rigid creditors, and sometimes selling him, with his wife 
and children, into perpetual foreign slavery, ” or the form 
whereby the creditors might cut the debtor’s body into pieces, 
and each take his proportionate share.”1 It was the Christian 
emperors of Rome who first denied a “Shylock” his pound of 
flesh and permitted a debtor to turn over his assets to his 
creditors in lieu of his person.
The first English Bankruptcy Act in 1542, and the first 
American Bankruptcy Act of 1800, applied only to traders. As 
Blackstone stated, “that class of men are, generally speaking, 
the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability 
to pay their debts, without any fault of their own;” whereas, 
if persons in other situations of life run into debt, they must 
take the consequences of their own indiscretion.”2 But Black- 
stone s argument did not prevail and non-traders were included
L. Y. Smith and G. G. Roberson, Business Law: Uniform Commercial 
Code Edition, (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1962), p. 1155.
2I b i d p. 1155.
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within the scope of the second Bankruptcy Act passed by Con 
gress in 1841. Under the authority specifically granted in the 
Constitution,3 Congress has passed a total of four bankruptcy 
acts. The last of these acts, passed on July 1, 1898, was over 
hauled by Congress in 1938. The revision is known as the 
Chandler Act and remains, for the most part, the law today.
Recent articles in national, state, and local news media indi 
cate that many people are concerned with the growing prob 
lem of bankruptcy. It seems also to be true that, like the 
weather, everyone is talking about bankruptcy but no one is 
doing anything about it.4 One reason is that there is little 
agreement as to the cause (s) of bankruptcy among attorneys, 
businessmen, lenders, and consumer-creditors.
It is doubtful that very many bankruptcy petitioners proceed 
because the exemptions are attractive, although substantial 
assets are exempted for some types of applicants. Montana 
law provides for each bankrupt the exemption of such valued 
necessities as wearing apparel, books (to $200), household fur 
niture, one sewing machine, stove and stove-pipes, bedsteads, 
three months’ fuel and food, one horse, saddle and bridle, two 
cows and their calves, four hogs and 50 domestic fowls, feed 
for animals for three months, one clock, and all family pictures 
(among numerous other miscellaneous items).8
Specific exemptions are given for individuals in selected 
occupations. For example, the farmer can keep, among other 
things, the farming utensils or implements of husbandry, not 
exceeding in value six hundred dollars;0 doctors can keep one 
vehicle and harness or other equipment used in making profes 
sional visits, with food for such horse, mule, or oxen for three 
months;7 debtors who are heads of families, or are 60 years of 
age, can keep “one truck or automobile of the value of not more 
than three hundred dollars.”8 Montana law capriciously places *
*The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Sec. 8.
‘There are a few exceptions: see The Great Falls Tribune, January 31, 
1963, page 17, which describes a cooperative debt counseling program. 
“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Sec. 93-5813, p. 441.
’Ibid., Sec. 93-5814, p. 442.
Tbid., Sec. 93- 5814, p. 443.
"Ibid., Sec. 93-5820, p. 447.
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rigid dollar limits on exemptions in some categories and none 
at all in others.
There is no way to measure the grief, embarrassment, or 
guilt of those taking the bankruptcy course. Those who are the 
innocent victims of accidents or ill health deserve the chance 
to start again, but many who undertake bankruptcy do so 
reluctantly, feeling that the action is unavoidable yet immoral. 
Others choose bankruptcy to avoid garnishment because, since 
garnishment may involve loss of one’s job, it is even more to 
be avoided.
Certainly creditors are not enthusiastic when their custom 
ers wipe the slate clean and leave them to pick up the tab. In 
1962, in Montana, creditors in bankruptcy actions were owed 
$2,893,653, but the shown assets of debtors were only $804,995.° 
Also in that year, unsecured creditors received only 4.5 percent 
of the sums due them.10
What is the evidence that bankruptcies are increasing? Refer 
ring to Table 1, we can observe that, for the United States, 
total bankruptcies increased from 10,195 in 1946, to 147,780 in 
1962. In Montana, over the same years, the increase was from 
20 to 559. For fiscal year 1963 it is possible that:
. . . during this year 170,000 bankruptcy cases will be listed in 
the 90 district courts of the United States and of these cases, 
probably 100,000 will be no-asset cases with scheduled liabilities 
approximating $500 million. The bulk of this half-billion dollar 
loss will be in cases known as consumer bankruptcies.”
What factors may account for the large number of bankrupt 
cies in recent years? One might expect the growth of bank 
ruptcies roughly to parallel the gains in number of residents 
for the country. Such is not the case, however. The percentage 
increase in total bankruptcies after accounting for population 
change show that total U. S. bankruptcies increased 1,003 per 
cent (1946-1962) while Montana shows a 1,920 percent increase 
(see Table 1). The percentage of increase comparison is mis-
*The Daily Missoulian, Missoula, Montana, February 4, 1963, p. 2. 
’“Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statis 
tics, June 30, 1962, Washington, D.C., Table F. 6.
’’Reginald W. McDuffee, “Wage Earner (Chapter XIII) Proceedings in 
the Bankruptcy Court,” The Business Lawyer, April, 1962, Vol. XVII, 
No. 3, p. 678.
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leading, however; comparing the number of bankruptcies per 
100,000 people we find that in the last six years the Montana 
rate has merely caught up with the national rate after being 
roughly one-half as great for eleven prior years.
If we subtract the business bankruptcies from these figures, 
we see that the absolute change of nonbusiness bankruptcies, 
1946 to 1962, was from 8,566 to 132,118 (see Table 2). After 
adjusting for population growth, the nation still showed an 
increase of 1,064 percent; Montana’s increase of nonbusiness 
bankruptcies was more than double this figure. As was noted 
above, the Montana rate in absolute numbers simply caught 
up with the national rate. The rising incidence of bankruptcy 
obviously is not accounted for by population changes, then.
Next, one might try to relate financial failure to income and 
one’s ability to pay. In theory at least, with substantial in 
creases in personal incomes, one might reasonably expect a 
decline in the number of people initiating bankruptcy. Again 
we are disappointed. For the United States the increase in non 
business bankruptcies was from 49 per billion dollars of per 
sonal income in 1946, to 302 in 1962, an increase of 519 percent. 
(Table 3). We know that inflation cannot account for the 
change since prices have not risen by anything approaching 
500 percent.12 Real incomes were rising, not falling. In Montana, 
the nonbusiness bankruptcy rate per billion dollars of per 
sonal income was 24 in 1946, and 321 in 1962, a 1,214 percent 
increase. In real terms, the non-business bankruptcy rate per 
billion dollars of personal income for Montana has doubled in 
the two-year interval 1960-1962; it is actually ahead of the 
United States ratio! The rise in the number of bankruptcies 
occurred despite substantial personal income increases.
It was argued by some with whom we talked that the rising 
bankruptcy rate could be attributed to the growing number 
of attorneys. The hypothesis was that a greater supply of attor 
neys, unable to create or initiate legal controversy and lucra 
tive fees, would naturally give increasing attention to bank 
ruptcy and similar marginal legal tasks in order to produce
’“Wholesale prices for March, 1963, were only 16.4 percent above the 
1949 index; consumer prices for February, 1963, were 23.1 percent 
above the index for 1949. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1963, p. 532.)
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revenues. While our investigation of this point was cursory, 
the evidence obtained did not support the argument. In the 
first place, a quick glance at the Minimum Fee Schedule of the 
Western Montana Bar Association is persuasive evidence that 
bankruptcy action fees are not attractive to lawyers. In the 
second place, for the state of Montana, during the twelve years 
1950-1961 the number of practicing attorneys increased less 
than 45 percent, while the number of bankruptcies increased 
27 times during the same period. Indeed, two counties (Mis 
soula and Silver Bow) which had substantial increases in bank 
ruptcies for 1957-1961, during the same interval had a decrease 
in the number of attorneys.13
The increase in the number of U.S. retail establishments
TABLE 4









1946 .............. 104.8 1,458
1947 ___ 122.4 1,627
1948 133.7 1,730
1949 133.8 1,783
1950 ___ 147.2 1,802
1951 156.6 1,821
1952 .... 162.4 1,831
1953 ..... 169.1 1,846





1959 .... 215.4 1,977
I960 219.5 1,997
1961 218.8 2,011
























Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, 
Business Statistics, 1961 Edition, and Survey of Current Business.
'“Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, (Summit, New Jersey: Martindale- 
Hubbell, Inc.), Volumes 82-93 (1950-1961).
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competing for consumers’ dollars was only 39 percent from 
1946 to 1962; moreover, there was an increase in the average • 
sales per establishment of 61 percent (Table 4). This element • 
seems to be minor in explaining the increase of bankruptcies.
It is obvious that changes in population, in income, in the 
numbers of firms and attorneys, and other lesser factors do 
help to establish the frequency of both types of bankruptcies.
It is even possible that non-business bankruptcies can be re 
lated to the growing number of consumer finance companies, 
or to the increasing proportion of debt consolidation loans 
(whereby the lender becomes a primary creditor); however, 
time did not permit the exploration of all possibilities. Tech 
nology, industry structural changes, and migration of markets
TABLE 5
TOTAL BANKRUPTCIES AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES 
PER BILLION DOLLARS OF CONSUMER CREDIT, 
UNITED STATES, 1946-1962
Bankruptcies 








(1946 =  100) Number
Index
(1946=100)
1946 -------- 8.4 1,214 100.0 1,020 100.0
1947 11.6 1,135 93.5 882 86.5
1948 -------- 14.4 1,285 105.8 940 92.2
1949 17.3 1,504 123.9 1,106 108.4
1950 21.4 1,560 128.5 1,170 114.7
1951 -------- 22.6 1,557 128.2 1,230 120.6
1952 27.5 1,268 104.4 1,030 101.0
1953 31.4 1,277 105.2 1,061 104.0
1954 32.5 1,635 134.7 1,361 133.4
1955 38.8 1,531 126.1 1,294 126.9
1956 42.3 1,468 120.9 1,244 122.0
1957 45.0 1,639 135.0 1,414 138.6
1958 45.1 2,032 167.4 1,780 174.5
1959 --------51.5 1,955 161.0 1,727 169.3
1960 56.0 1,965 161.9 1,746 171.2
1961 -------- 57.7 2,541 209.3 2,277 223.21962 63.4 2,331 192.0 2,084 204.3
bankruptcies on fiscal year basis.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and Board of Gov 
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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may also account for numerous business failures. Nevertheless, 
for the “non-business bankrupt,” the major cause appears to be 
easy credit, and it may well be a principal factor in business 
mortality, too. Of much greater importance than the number 
of competing firms is the degree of competition between them; 
an increasingly common merchandising technique is credit sell 
ing which can be a very aggressive competitive element.
When we refer to Table 5, it is quickly apparent that the rate 
of increase in the volume of consumer credit more closely 
approximates the rate of increase of bankruptcies than does 
any other index examined so far. It seems to be a standard 
practice for retailers of all kinds of merchandise to offer 
credit. Credit availability is a major patronage motive. Ex 
tended terms are often characterized as “hidden price cuts.” 
Even the largest traditional cash and carry merchants have 
adopted credit plans in recent years (Sears, Wards, and Pen- 
neys, for example).
During the first seventeen post World War II years the level 
of consumer credit grew each year; it was 655 percent greater 
in 1962 than in 1946. It is granted that American consumers 
had great liquidity and considerable assets in 1946, so that one 
might properly question the validity of this year as a base. 
However, Table 6 (Column 6) shows that this splurge had 
run its course by 1951, yet in both absolute and real terms 
the volume of credit continued to grow rapidly. It must be 
noted that consumers’ net worth also increased greatly during 
this period. From 1952 to 1962 the increase was from $849.4 bil 
lion to $1,525.6 billion.14
Column 3 of the same table shows the ratio of consumer 
credit to total retail sales. The role of credit is dramatically 
apparent. In every year since 1946, the ratio of consumer credit 
outstanding to total retail sales has increased. From 8.0 percent 
in 1946 it rose to 26.9 percent in 1962. The willingness to borrow 
is evident, but so is the willingness to lend.
Equally interesting is the relationship of consumer credit 
to personal income for this period of time. In every year but
“National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Facts Yearbook, 
Washington, D.C., p. 30,
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three, the credit figure as a percentage of aggregate personal 
income has grown larger. The years of exception (1951, 1958, 
and 1961) were all years of recession or readjustment. In 1962, 
the peak figure of 14.5 percent was achieved. With another 
seven million unit automobile year in the making, this figure 
may well exceed 15 percent for 1963.15
In Chart I the downturns of 1957-58 and 1960-61 (see below)
CHART I
CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT AS A PERCENT OF 
DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME, 1956-1962 
(quarterly totals seasonally adjusted at annual rates)
Ptf Ctnt
Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact 
Yearbook. (Federal Reserve Board and Department of Commerce), 
Chart 22, p. 36.
are also mirrored in the higher “repayment to borrowed” ratio. 
It is interesting to note the reaction of different business media 
pundits to this behavior. A bank newsletter comments:
This ratio of instalment repayments to disposable personal in 
come rose for a decade after World War II as people were 
equipping themselves with new cars and appliances . . .  There is 
certainly no fixed limit on the amount of instalment credit 
which consumers may commit themselves to repaying. There is 
a long-term trend toward financing an increasing share of pur-
“Table 9 shows that, for 1962, of the total instalment credit of $48.2 
billion, $19.4 billion was in automobile paper.
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chases on credit, and the fact that individuals are willing to 
enlarge their forward commitments is evidence of optimism 
over the outlook and their ability to meet future payments. The 
current period of business expansion can be prolonged if people 
do not go overboard borrowing to spend and if instalment lend 
ers avoid unsound extension of credit terms.18
Despite the evidence cited that credit has been a major ele 
ment in the tremendous post-war boom and sustained economic 
growth, these bankers contradict their own data by concluding 
that the current expansion can be extended if people buy less 
(by borrowing less).
Forbes magazine took a different point of view:
The old American virtue of thrift may, as many sociologists 
insist, have fallen victim to the blandishments of instalment- 
plan buying. Be that as it may, the U.S. consumer has not gone 
hog-wild: the average family has displayed a stubbornly sen 
sible refusal to allow its instalment obligations to get above 
13 percent of disposable income. Through mid-year, in fact, 
consumers repaid their debts faster than they were incurring 
new ones . . . All of which may have been reassuring in a moral 
sense, but it tended to hold back the boom many economists 
thought the U.S. would be having by now.17
This respected journal is probably more representative of 
over-all business sentiment (judging from the willingness of 
merchants to extend credit.) Obviously, borrowing by business 
firms to finance plant expansion or equipment purchases is 
part of essential planning for orderly firm growth; this sort of 
debt has increased enormously. Denying consumers the same 
rationale is at least confusing, if not unfair.
Easy credit can, and does, stimulate buying, production, 
employment, and profits. However, it may and does contribute 
to bankruptcy, bad debt losses, social frustration, higher oper 
ating costs for creditors, and higher prices for the consumers 
who do pay their bills on time (or in cash).
Retailers seem to be taking a curious moral position when 
they advise that customers should not over-extend themselves. 
In effect they are telling money-short customers to ignore 
sellers’ (and/or lenders’) blandishments in flashing neon or *14
First National City Bank of New York, Monthly Economic Letter, 
June, 1963, p. 63.
14“Too Much Thrift/’ Forbes, November 15, 1961, p. 38.
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blatant headlines . . . Easy Credit . . .  No Money Down . . . 
36 Months to Pay . . . Lay Away Your Christmas Gifts Now, 
First Payment in February . . . No Co-Signers . . . Up to $500 
on Your Signature . . . Choose from Three Convenient Credit 
Plans, and so on. The ultimate in such exhortations was prob 
ably reached in Chicago used-car advertising as noted in Time 
magazine:
(a) STOP!! If you have just turned 21— been repossessed — 
bad credit problems — been turned down — then now is the 
time to see us. Bankrupt?? WE FINANCE ANYONE! Try 
our easy credit “OK.”
(b) BANKRUPT? Short on cash — been turned down — Just
turned 21? No red tape. See M r._____ WORKINGMAN’S
FRIEND. Free, easy credit “OK.”
(c) WALK IN. DRIVE OUT. Bankrupt? Short on cash? Bad 
credit? Just turned 21? Been turned down? WE FINANCE 
ANYONE! Free tank of gas. Free license plates.1*
The above copy appeared in three adjoining column ads 
in a recent issue of the Chicago Sun Times. Retailers catering 
to bankrupt or other habitual bad-debtors seem to be carrying 
specialization too far. The paradoxical appeal to bankrupts as 
clientele is understandable only when it is noted that such 
individuals cannot petition again for bankruptcy for six years. 
Thus, garnishment cannot be aborted by a new bankruptcy 
action or the seller forced to settle his claim for some fraction 
of the dollar. Time magazine observes that “bankruptcies are 
highest in states that permit creditors to garnishee a hefty 
slice of debtors’ salaries.”10 One Montana attorney advised that 
his clients would not be dissuaded from taking bankruptcy; 
they panicked when their wages were garnished and they 
were left with too little income for basic food and shelter needs.
When we compare the performance of various sectors of the 
economy (Table 7), it does appear that consumers have been 
relatively irresponsible. Noncorporate and individual debt did 
increase 462.9 percent over the period 1946-1962.20 However
"Time, February 22, 1963, p. 44.
"Ibid., p. 44.
“The reader may also recall that the increase of consumer credit by 
itself, not including professional and farmer debt, was 655 percent.
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TABLE 7
NET PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DEBT, UNITED STATES,
1946-1962
(billions of dollars)
Net Private Debt Net Public Debt
Non-Corporate State
Year1 and Individual Corporate and Local Federal
1946 __________ ___  60.6 93.5 13.6 229.7
1947 __________ ___  70.8 108.9 14.4 223.3
1948 __________ ___  83.1 117.8 16.2 216.5
1949 __________ ___  93.7 118.0 18.1 218.6
1950 _____ ____ ___  108.8 142.1 20.7 218.7
1951................. ___  119.7 162.5 23.3 218.5
1952 ____ 135.5 171.0 25.8 222.9
1953 ________ 150.3 179.5 28.6 228.1
1954 ............. 165.6 182.8 33.4 230.2
1955 ________ ___  190.4 212.1 38.4 231.5
1956 ......... ___  207.7 231.7 42.7 225.4
1957 ........... 221.1 246.7 46.7 224.4
1958 ______ 239.4 259.5 50.9 232.7
1959 ............ 267.0 281.5 55.6 243.2
1960 ................ 288.3 294.8 60.0 241.0
1961 _____ ___ ___  312.3 311.5 65.0 248.1
1962 ...... ............ . 341.1 330.8 72.0 256.8
% Increase,
1946-1962 ___  +462.9 +253.8 +429.4 +  11.8
*As of December 31.
Source: Economic Report of the President, January 1963, Tables C-52 
and C-53, pp. 234-35.
this stricture is tempered when we also observe that net state 
and local debt rose nearly as much (429.4 percent). Business 
obligations also rose significantly, reaching a level more than 
two and one-half times as great in 1962 as in 1946.21 It may sur 
prise many to realize that net federal debt has grown so mod 
estly (11.8 percent) during the same interval.
fflCarl Reiser, “The Great Credit Pump,” Fortune, February, 1963, pp* 
122-157:
One of the most significant and least discussed statistics in 
the U.S. economy is the total of outstanding trade credit, the 
short-term credit that business extends to business. Estimates 
put it at nearly $10 billion more than the entire federal budget 
for 1963, some $20 billion more than the total value of all U.S. 
corporate bonds outstanding at the end of 1961, and about two 
and a half times the gross national product of Canada. It is in
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Let us return to the question of what moral issue is involved 
with regard to consumers. Business executives who borrow for 
their firms are also consumers; voter-taxpayers are also con 
sumers. A corporation borrows whenever it feels that this 
money can be put to use in generating revenues sufficient to 
pay back the principal, plus the costs of borrowing and yield 
some net contribution to profits. The voter approves higher 
tax burdens (and debt) when he values the services that gov 
ernments can provide (for example, education or highways) 
more than the money given up in taxes. Similarly, consumers 
seem willing to mortgage the future (the hereafter, too, 
according to some critics) in order to consume now. They 
heavily discount the benefits of higher future income flows 
relative to the purchase and enjoyment of goods and services 
today. But this is possible only through the acquiescence of 
financial and business creditors. If the consumer debt level is
the neighborhood of $100 billion. But even more dramatic than 
its sheer size is its growth rate. In the decade between 
1951 and 1961, while the U.S. gross national product, measured 
ni current dollars, grew 58 percent and nationwide sales grew 
37 percent, trade credit expanded by just about 100 percent.
(p. 122)
In some areas of business, creditors have already begun to 
sense the need for caution. In retailing, the great discount revo 
lution . . . has produced a number of new operators who are 
skating on very thin ice. Typically, many discounters use trade 
credit to finance growth; they buy goods on credit, turn the 
goods over, put the money into new goods and stores, and count 
on a further fast turnover to pay off their suppliers. Turnover is 
the key to discount operation, and it gives the discounter a 
considerable power over suppliers, who are so eager to get the 
discounters' volume business that they are willing to extend 
credit well beyond the limits of prudence indicated by the 
retailer's assets and working capital. According to Dun and 
Bradstreet, which regularly surveys some 200 discounters, the 
median figure for discount stores showed current assets 
at one and a half times debt in 1961. (Department stores, by 
contrast, had current assets of roughly three and a half times 
debt.) There has been a disturbing number of bankruptcies 
among discounters, and some suppliers are trying to tighten up 
credit terms, (p. 148)
A big aluminum company reports that, in 1962, 29 percent of 
its trade accounts were overdue as against only 15 percent in 
1955. The average age of receivables held by a major electrical 
manufacturer, to take another example, has jumped from forty 
days to more than fifty in the past five years, (p. 148)
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too high and if losses are too great, both parties to the contract 
are culpable.
If we can say that consumer borrowers borrow too much (the 
corollary is that lenders lend too much), what can and should 
be done to limit credit and reduce bankruptcies? Several rem 
edies should be explored. One would be to raise the price of 
eligibility for bankruptcy. Involuntary bankruptcy can be ini 
tiated by creditors when as little as $1,000 is owed; while the 
general price level has been steadily rising for many years, the 
entrance fee to bankruptcy court has remained the same. For 
a sum that is only half what many people borrow when buying 
a new car, the individual can be declared a bankrupt. A recent 
news item presented some interesting data on this problem.22 
It noted that eight individuals (or households) had filed bank 
ruptcy actions in the Federal Court in Butte, Montana. Total 
liabilities were shown to be $49,752 (average $6,219) and total 
assets were $2,650 (average $331). However, the six smaller 
liability actions had total liabilities of only $14,651 (average 
$2,441) and total assets of $2,300 (average $383, which is higher 
than the average for all, above). Of the latter group, one peti 
tioner had a net debt of only $738! If the eligibility figure were 
higher, say $3,000, many fewer would be eligible, and there 
would be a more realistic warning signal to merchants and 
other lenders. As it is, most of us now are potential bankrupts; 
with a higher limit, the lender might be more cautious if he 
notes from the loan or credit application that this purchase 
pushes the customer into the bankrupt-eligible class.23
“The Missoulian, Missoula, Montana, June 23, 1963, p. 16.
“The Bankruptcy Act, 7th Ed., Foundation Press, Inc., 1961, Chapter 3, 
Section 3 (11 U. S. C. § 21), p. 13.
The delinquent borrowers must, however, commit one of the 
six acts of bankruptcy: Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall 
consist of his having (1) concealed, removed, or permitted to 
be concealed or removed any part of his property, with intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of them, or made 
or suffered a transfer of any of his property, fraudulent under 
the provisions of section 67 or 70 of this Act; or (2) made or 
suffered a preferential transfer, as defined in subdivision (a) 
of section 60 of this Act; or (3) suffered or permitted, while 
insolvent, any creditor to obtain a lien upon any of his property 
through legal proceedings or distraint and not having vacated 
or discharged such lien within thirty days from the date thereof
BANKRUPTCY CAUSES AND REMEDIES 41
If there is no change in the eligibility price as discussed 
above, more use should be made of Chapter XIII of the bank 
ruptcy act which encourages and implements a plan for repay-
C HART II
PERCENT OF SPENDING UNITS COMMITTED TO VARIOUS 
AMOUNTS OF INSTALMENT CREDIT PAYMENTS AS A PERCENT 
OF DISPOSABLE INCOME, BY INCOME LEVEL, 1962
PERCENT
loo-i
NO INSTALMENT CREDIT PAYMENTS
PAYMENTS OF UNDER K>% OF 
DISPOSABLE INCOME
PAYMENTS OF 10% TO 19% OF 
DISPOSABLE INCOME





PAYMENTS OF 40%  AND OVER OF 
DISPOSABLE INCOME
1 UNDER S 2 ,0 0 0  S 2 ,0 0 0  -  4 ,9 9 9  S 5 ,0 0 0  -  7 ,4 9 9  9 7 ,0 0 0  -  9 ,9 9 9  1 1 0 ,0 0 0  a  OVER
Income Level
Yearbook. (Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan), 
Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact 
Chart 23, p. 38.
or at least five days before the date set for any sale or other 
disposition of such property; or (4) made a general assignment 
for the benefit of his creditors; or (5) while insolvent or unable 
to pay his debts as they m ature, procured, permitted, or suffered 
voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or 
trustee to take charge of his property; or (6) admitted in writing 
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ment out of earnings. (Discussion of this option is handled in 
Part II of this study.)
Table 8 shows the concentration of borrowers in the no- or 
low-asset classes, which is not unexpected. Wealthy persons 
do not often need to borrow; poor persons must borrow if they 
are to consume. What is surprising is the amount of instalment 
debt incurred by those with no liquid assets; for example, 15 
percent of all spending units with no liquid assets owe from 
$500 to $1,999 in instalment debt. Twenty-three percent of the 
spending units with liquid assets of $99 or less owe from $1,000 
to $1,999; eight percent owe more than $2,000! The responsi 
bility of lenders to evaluate borrowers’ repayment chances is
CHART III
PERCENT OF SPENDING UNITS COMMITTED TO VARIOUS 
AMOUNTS OF INSTALMENT CREDIT PAYMENTS AS A 
PERCENT OF DISPOSABLE INCOME, BY AGE GROUP, 1962
Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact 
Yearbook. (Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan), 
Chart 24, p. 39.
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well accepted. But Table 8 illustrates the creditor’s dilemma; 
the typical instalment buyer is wanting in financial resources.
Of the various disposable income levels (see Chart II), the 
group with $10,000 or more per year contains the greatest pro 
portion of individuals whose instalment payments constitute 
10 percent or less of income; the $7,500 to $9,999 group has the 
greatest proportion of individuals making payments of 20-39 
percent; but the income level with the greatest proportion of 
instalment payments equal to 40 percent or more of income, 
is the group in the under $2,000 range. The $7,500 to $9,999 
group had a greater proportion of its total spending units 
engaged in some degree of instalment buying.
By age group (Chart III), the greatest users of instalment 
contracts are the spending units in the age range of 25-34 years. 
This is a natural consequence of family formation and home 
buying. What is significant in this chart is the very substan 
tial proportion of high instalment payments in the 18-24 age 
group. Chart IV is a vulnerability comparison, by spending 
unit income levels (which, however, indirectly reflect age 
and liquid asset holdings).24 The alarming number of vulner 
able credit users in the income range of $3,000 to $7,499 should 
be noted, especially by those who extend credit.
In addition to watching carefully the age, income level, assets, 
and current debt of customers, Montana merchants should also
“National Consumer Finance Association, op. cit., pp. 38-39:
The following criteria were used: 1) repayment of instalment 
debts at current rate would take more than one year, 2) $200 or 
less of liquid assets, 3) personal instalment debt repayments 
more than 20 percent of annual income. Characteristics 1 and 2 
placed the family with instalment debt in the “vulnerable” 
category. If the third characteristic was also present, the family 
was considered “very vulnerable” to any financial reverse. 
Mortgage debt and non-instalment debt are excluded.
Based on these criteria, the percentage in the “vulnerable” 
group in 1959 varied from a high of 9 percent in the income 
levels of $4,000 to $4,999 annually, where some 56 percent 
were making instalment credit payments, to a low of 1 percent 
in the $10,000 and over income group, where some 37 percent 
were making instalment credit payments. Those in the “very 
vulnerable” group varied from a high of 9 percent in the $3,000 
to $3,999 category, where some 52 percent were making instal 
ment payments, to a low of 1 percent in the $10,000 and over 
category.
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CHART IV
ALL SPENDING UNITS COMMITTED TO INSTALMENT 
CREDIT PAYMENTS AND THEIR VULNERABILITY TO 
FINANCIAL REVERSES. BY INCOME LEVEL, 1959
PERCENT m  NOT VULNERABLE
VERY VULNERABLE 
VULNERABLE
UNDER 2,000 4 ,000 6 ,000  10,000
1,00 0 2,999 4,999 7 ,499 AND OVER
1,000 3,000 5 ,0 0 0  7,500
1,999 3,999 5 ,9 9 9  9 ,999
Income Level
Source: National Consumer Finance Association, 1963 Finance Fact 
Yearbook. (Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan), 
Chart 25, p. 39.
verify employment and income. It will probably be necessary 
for merchants to take the lead in keeping their patrons out of 
trouble, since to rely on borrowers to change their behavior is 
probably naive.
There are other ways to limit or reduce losses. Undoubtedly, 
more merchants could specify a down payment, or increase the 
size of the payment required without a loss of desirable cus 
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to discourage opportunists that exploit this financing service 
when it is free. (Credit is never actually free, but is frequently 
subsidized by the cash buyer who pays the same prices for 
goods. A cost of credit exists whether a charge for it is directly 
made or not.) Possibly some restraint could be exercised in 
offering credit via advertising or other communications to pro 
spective customers. Effectiveness in present credit strategy is 
a double-edged sword — it usually brings in the “no-pays” and 
the “slow pays” as well as the prompt-pay customers.
Finally, many American merchants must put their own 
houses in order before they moralize about consumer behavior. 
In the Fortune article cited above it may be recalled that busi 
ness debt has been rising dramatically. This often creates pres 
sure to liquidate inventories; while discount houses take the 
price-cutting alternative, many traditional merchants accept 
poor credit risks at full-margin prices. While this is not the 
time or place to debate this retailing phenomenon, at least it can 
be observed that the discounter typically gets cash (for the 
repayment of his obligations) and not an open account of pos 
sibly dubious worth.
In summary, we have found that bankruptcies have increased 
rapidly since World War II. In looking for causes of non 
business bankruptcies, we have rejected population changes, 
income changes, numbers of attorneys, and numbers of retail 
ers as major factors. We have not had the time to examine 
other elements of merchant competition (changes in market 
shares, for example), and various sociological and psychological 
influences that may well have a bearing on the problem. There 
is some evidence, however, that consumer credit (offered and 
accepted) plays a principal role in determining how many citi 
zens will petition for bankruptcy.
We have discussed several areas where merchants might 
take action to lessen the number of delinquent debtors and to 
control more effectively the amount of borrowing. These sug 
gestions are of limited value though, in dealing with today’s 
over-extended creditor. For the handling of that problem, Part 
II should be of interest to the reader.
PART II
Bankruptcy Causes and Remedies
GEORGE L. MITCHELL 
Instructor, Business Administration 
Montana State University, Missoula
Let’s Not Go Bankrupt!
In the last half century, the American attitude toward bank 
ruptcy appears to have changed radically. The pendulum of 
society’s judgment has swung from the unconscionable sever 
ity mentioned by Blackstone to a point where the stigma of fail 
ure has been virtually removed, both by social inclination and 
by legislative design.1 Seemingly, none of the changes which 
accompanied the evolution from severity to sympathy or sanc 
tion have provided an answer for the problem of the debtor 
who cannot make his creditors whole again.
The problem seems to be one of fulfilling the social need met 
by bankruptcy legislation without incurring those ills which 
invariably accompany such an act. That Congress has passed 
four Bankruptcy Acts would seem to indicate that the prob 
lems in the absence of such legislation are even greater than 
those which accompany it, and that repeal offers no lasting 
solution. Thus, if the history of bankruptcy law and the statis 
tics pertaining to the administration thereof are a valid indica 
tion, the Bankruptcy Act will not only continue to exist but 
, will grow in the scope of its application. As noted in Part I, the 
majority of present day bankruptcies are voluntary and are 
. filed by wage earners.2 It is with this segment of the total bank 
ruptcy problem that the remainder of this article will deal.
The American Bar Association has established a new com-
’Theodore Sager Meth, “Ethical and Economic Considerations in Chapter 
XIII Proceedings,” Journal of the National Association of Referees in 
Bankruptcy, April 1962, Vol. 36, No. 2.
“Charles Henry Rudolph, Jr., “Bankruptcy — Chapter X III Wage Earn 
er’s Plans,” West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64 (1961-62), p. 217.
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mittee to study the causes for the high incidence of nonbusiness 
or employee type bankruptcy. Nevertheless, there are some 
factors which, though they may defy classification in terms 
of relative importance, are sufficiently apparent to be recog 
nized as causes of the problem. Certain business practices fall 
within this category. The creditor titillates the consumer’s 
“buying nerve” with highly developed advertising, the mer 
chandising department displays the wares in the most attrac 
tive fashion, the credit department grants credit easily, often 
with little or no investigation due to the lack of facilities or 
cost of such procedure;, then when the consumer defaults, the 
creditor is filled with righteous indignation.
There is no denying the importance of “credit.” It, perhaps 
more than anything else, has been responsible for the develop 
ment of our industrial power and our technological advance 
ment. Yet the increasing competition for the consumer dollar 
has led to practices which permit the consumer to purchase 
on credit with a facility which is partially responsible for the 
current rise in number of wage earner bankruptcies.
The responsibility is not the creditor’s alone. The debtor is 
to some extent a victim of his creditors, because of his vulner 
ability to advertising, his susceptibility to the blandishments 
of an acquisitive society, and his lack of enough business 
sophistication to make and keep a sensible budget. But, even 
in the case of a debtor who does not actually practice decep 
tion or make fraudulent conveyances or otherwise attempt to 
frustrate creditors, one can question the integrity of an indi 
vidual who incurs debts which he cannot rationally expect to
pay.
The magnitude of the effect to which these and other causes 
lead is adequately reflected by the statistical analysis pre 
sented. When considered in terms of the individual debtor, the 
impact is mostly personal in nature. His relationship with 
friends and the community and his anxiety over the welfare 
of his family as well as his regard for himself and his own 
capabilities best illustrate this facet of the problem. The impact 
on the creditor, on the other hand, depends upon the type of 
creditor and upon his relationship to the debtor. The loss may 
merely result in an adjustment in the “reserve for bad debts,”
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thus diminishing the impact by its tax treatment, or the impact 
may be lessened by dispersing the loss among individual stock 
holders, or it may be felt very deeply by one dependent upon 
payment or by a friend. Whatever the immediate impact upon 
individual businesses or persons of the failure of the debtor 
to pay, the problem on a national scale assumes gigantic pro 
portions, and it is growing in dimension.
Any solution to this problem must consider the possibilities 
of dealing with it at its source. Wage earners cannot over 
extend their credit without the help of creditors. Yet to elim 
inate the great and complex system of credit upon which the 
commercial world is so dependent is impracticable. What are 
the available alternatives? First, creditors could simply recog 
nize the risks inherent in easy extension of credit to achieve 
volume sales, and assume those risks. Calculated increases in 
“reserves,” more extensive use of security devices such as con 
ditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages to improve their 
position in the event of default, coupled with a general regard 
for such losses as a business expense would all tend to lessen 
the impact. The problem would then be one of determining 
the point of diminishing return in such a policy. Another alter 
native may be to impose some restriction upon the extension 
of credit. Such restriction could come from within by creating 
better facilities for the investigation of credit standings or the 
maintenance of cumulative and current records. The question 
then would be whether the expenses of creating and maintain 
ing such facilities would justify their continued existence and 
perfection.
Restrictions upon the extension of credit could also be im 
posed from without. On September 1, 1941, federal regulation 
I of consumer credit (known as Regulation “W”) was adopted 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Its 
;. main objective was to reduce the volume of consumer credit 
so as to lessen inflation and pressure during war time. It pro 
vided for one-third down-payment of the purchase price and 
limited the extent of the time for payment. The national maga 
zine Business Week reported, four years after the adoption of 
Regulation “W,” that as of that date not only had consumer 
credit halved in amount, but that retail sales had increased.
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Retailers are divided in opinion as to whether a peacetime 
economy would yield similar results, and whether Regulation 
“W i n  some substantially similar form, should be reinstated 
now.
An additional means may be to explore the possibility of 
reducing the number of straight bankruptcies (those which 
result in present liquidation of assets and discharge). Because 
the debtor may proceed under the provisions for straight bank 
ruptcy if he so desires, and because the lures of expediency, low 
cost, and ultimate discharge are strong, any attempt to induce 
the debtor to take another course of action would have to 
include a reasonable alternative.
A brief discussion of the alternatives which are currently 
available to a debtor who cannot pay his debts in Montana 
may lend itself to a better understanding of why so many 
choose voluntarily to petition for bankruptcy.
First, there is the Common Law Composition. While there 
is no statutory provision for such agreements, they are recog 
nized by the courts as valid under the Common Law.3 Such a 
composition is an agreement between the debtor and his credit 
ors whereby the creditors take in proportion to the amount 
owed to them a part of their claims and the debtor is discharged 
from the balance, since the whole amount is deemed satisfied 
by payment of the part. One disadvantage of such an agree 
ment is that it is contractual in nature and is dependent for its 
success upon the voluntary consent of all the creditors, for only 
the claims of creditors who voluntarily consent to the compo 
sition and thereby voluntarily release the balance of their 
claims are precluded from bringing suit for the balance due. 
Another disadvantage of the composition is the fact that any 
creditor can attach the assets of the debtor during the usual 
period of bargaining and negotiation which precedes the execu 
tion of the composition agreement.
Second, there is a statutory alternative available to the debtor 
in the form of an assignment for the benefit of creditors.4 Such 
an assignment is a transfer of all of the debtor’s assets, save
Pioneer Mineral Corp. vs. Larabie Bros. Bankers, Inc., Montana Re 
ports, Vol. 99, p. 358.
‘Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Title 18, Chapter 3, Vol. 2.
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those things specifically exempted by statute, to an assignee 
in trust, or trustee, who applies the property to the payment of 
the debtor’s debts on a pro rata basis.5 Unlike the composition, 
the assignment for the benefit of creditors does not require 
the consent of the creditors.0 Also, it halts the race of diligent 
creditors in their attempt to acquire prior rights in the debtor’s 
assets by immunizing them from execution and attachment. 
But, since the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from 
impairing the obligation of a contract between private citizens, 
the statute cannot force all creditors to discharge the debtor 
upon pro rata distribution of the assets. Thus, the debtor, 
though he has parted with all of his assets save those exempted 
by statute, remains liable to the full extent of any balance due 
after pro rata distribution of said assets and is denied a 
discharge.
Third, the debtor may choose to proceed under the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Act. The disadvantages inherent in the 
alternatives provided at the Common Law and State Statutory 
level lead many to choose to proceed under the terms of this 
Act. Often the debtor is seeking only to relieve himself from 
the harassment of garnishment or attachment proceedings, or 
letters of debt-complaint to his employer, which often result 
in the debtor’s losing his job. Under the Bankruptcy Act he 
is not dependent upon the consent of his creditors; nor is the 
federal government, as are the states, precluded from granting 
him a discharge by any constitutional provision against the 
impairment of contracts.
What, then, could be presented to the debtor as an alterna 
tive sufficiently attractive to induce him to take some course 
of action other than straight bankruptcy? A growing number 
of experts in the field of bankruptcy law feel that a substantial 
portion of the annual loss due to no-asset bankruptcies might 
be salvaged through broader and more effective use of a pro 
vision of the Bankruptcy Act itself which has been in the law 
since September 22, 1938. This provision has received little 
attention compared to the straight bankruptcy provisions.
“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Sections 18-301 to 18-330.
“Pioneer Mineral Corp., et al., op. cit., p. 358.
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Only fourteen Districts of the United States have utilized this 
method in more than 15 percent of their employee-type cases 
over the ten-year period of 1952-1961 inclusive.7 The provision 
of which I speak is the Chapter XIII proceeding, or, as it is 
often called, “the wage-earner plan.”
The wage earner plan provides for a composition or exten 
sion, or both, agreed to by a majority in number and amount of 
the creditors, and confirmed by the bankruptcy court. Thus it is 
made binding upon all creditors, even the minority who did 
not agree. According to the plan, payment is made out of the 
debtor’s future earnings or wages, and all action by diligent 
creditors against the debtor are stayed during the term of the 
plan. Straight bankruptcy does not deal with the debtor’s ability 
to earn or pay in the future and thus it eliminates time, the very 
essence of credit transactions. A Chapter XIII proceeding per 
mits the debtor first to surrender relatively valuable, but ines 
sential assets, and then embark upon a program of payment- 
out-of-earnings which will not be of so great duration as to 
destroy his incentive. The debtor submits his future earnings 
to court control and the court thereafter makes an equitable 
distribution, through a trustee, to the creditors. Should the 
debtor be unable to meet his commitments according to the 
plan in a Chapter XIII proceeding, he may petition to be adjudi 
cated a bankrupt under Section 666 (2) of the Act.
It should be pointed out that the alternative route through 
the wage earner plan is not the simplest nor the easiest for any 
of the parties concerned. For the debtor it means added 
expense, for it is he who must pay his attorney, the trustee, 
and the cost of the action. It is the debtor who chooses to add 
this additional expense to his other financial problems in order 
to pay his bills. For the debtor’s attorney it means more involve 
ment and time expended at a much lower rate of return than 
that which is provided by any of a multitude of other more 
lucrative activities. For a trustee, appointed by the court, to 
be assured of equitable distribution of the wage earner’s in 
come requires continued supervision and recognition of chang-
Tteginald W. McDuffee, “Wage Earner (Chapter X III) Proceedings in 
the Bankruptcy Court,” The Business Lawyer, April 1962, Vol. XVII, 
No. 3, p. 680.
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ing circumstances. The referee must be dedicated to the con 
cept of rehabilitation, the employer must be amenable to this 
type of relief, and the debtor himself must have enough 
income to more than meet his needs and have a strong desire 
to pay his debts. It has been said that the essential elements 
for a successful Chapter XIII proceeding are:
1. A debtor with a job who desires to pay all or part of his 
debts and who will budget his living expenses to apply 
part of his future earnings to the payment of the past due 
claims.
2. Creditors who are willing to extend the time for payment 
of, or reduce the amount of, their claims, or both, to help 
rehabilitate the debtor.
3. The power in the courts to protect the debtor from cred 
itors attempting to seize debtor’s assets or force payment; 
to permit payments to a trustee for pro-rata distribution 
to creditors; and to allow the debtor the use of his neces 
sary property in order to carry out his budgeted program 
and retain his job.
4. An attorney familiar with Chapter XIII proceedings to 
advise and help the debtor prepare a plan acceptable to 
creditors and with resourcefulness to help him with his 
problems during the time the plan is in effect.8
In addition, the wage earner plan requires the debtor to 
relinquish his income over an extended period of time; whereas 
a discharge in straight bankruptcy not only relieves him of 
past obligations, but imposes no obligation upon his future 
income.
Yet, despite these and other difficulties, use of the wage 
earner plan is on the increase in many districts. To some extent 
this is due to the desire of the debtors to pay their debts. One 
experienced referee in bankruptcy is firmly convinced that 
75 percent or more of the wage earners really desire to pay 
their debts if afforded an opportunity, and especially if skilled
“Wesley E. Brown, “A Prim er on W age-Earner Plans Under Chapter 
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,” The Business Lawyer, April 1962, Vol. 
XVII, No. 3.
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assistance is available.9 This commendable desire on the part 
of such debtors might be used to better advantage if the wage 
earner plan were more strongly advocated and if professional ; 
assistance were made less expensive and more readily available.
This presents a problem of educating all the potential parties 
to such a proceeding. Many debtors are not aware that such a ' 
plan exists, and, believing straight bankruptcy to be the only j 
solution to their problems, present an attorney with a request 
that he file a bankruptcy petition on their behalf. Many attor 
neys are equally unaware of the wage earner plan, and others 
simply fail to advise the debtor of its availability and comply 
with the debtor’s request to file the bankruptcy petition in I 
order to avoid the additional complexity of proceeding under 
Chapter XIII. Many attorneys understandably prefer to utilize 
the straight bankruptcy proceeding because it may be accom 
plished with great facility; whereas the Chapter XIII proceed 
ing requires that they formulate a plan agreeable to the credit 
ors and present it in an acceptable manner, and further, must 
continually advise their client during the pendency of the 
proceedings. The relatively low rate of return for time spent 
and continued effort expended leads many attorneys to prefer 
more compensating endeavors.
It cannot be expected that the attorney should become a 
social engineer or counselor in family finance, anymore than 
it can be expected that the referee in bankruptcy or the credit 
ors of the debtor themselves should undertake such an onerous 
task. But the process of education need not cease with univer 
sal awareness of the wage earner plan as an existing, practical 
and advantageous alternative to straight bankruptcy. That 
there are plans available to treat the financial illness of insolv 
ency is not enough. Such proceedings, under any Chapter, 
should be schools of practical economics for the noncommercial 
community. The Chairman of the Consumer Bankruptcy Com 
mittee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business 
Law of the American Bar Association, Referee Miles C. Riley, 
has said, “Persons in financial distress now contact their attor-
“Miles C. Riley, Referee, “Chapter XIIIs in the Madison Bankruptcy 
Court,” Journal of the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy, 
April, 1963, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 55.
BANKRUPTCY CAUSES AND REMEDIES 57
neys who file petitions for them, usually for adjudication and 
to obtain a discharge. The bankrupt plods his way to discharge 
or denial and goes on without being skillfully advised as to why 
he became financially distressed or what he should do in the 
future .. .”10 The cure would seem to lie in instruction. A source 
of expert assistance readily available to debtors, attorneys, 
creditors, and referees alike could be the medicine to effect 
such a cure. Such a source is not presently available in a vast 
majority of the jurisdictions and the burden of any amount of 
instruction which is given falls upon those who quite under 
standably have neither the time, facilities, nor the inclination 
to bear that burden.
One district, plagued with the same universal problems, 
actively sought a solution. The Court has employed an expert 
counselling staff which is made available to both the attorneys 
and the debtors throughout the entire Chapter XIII proceed 
ings, for advice and assistance. They make no claim to the 
discovery of a panacea which dissolved problems overnight, 
but they have discovered that the plan works and that the fol 
lowing advantages result from the use thereof:
Advantages to the attorneys who initiate the proceeding
(a) the attorney does not bear the full burden of formulat 
ing the debtor’s proposal;
(b) he can obtain more efficient and expedient relief for 
his client;
(c) he need not continuously advise his client during the 
pendency of the proceeding;
(d) his fee is collected by the bankruptcy court and he may 
avail himself of the assistance of the counselling staff if 
he so desires.
Advantages to the debtors
(a) lower cost of relief and amortized payments thereof;
(b) continuous aid and advice by expert counselling staff;
(c) protection from repossessions and other attempts of
10Meth, op. cit., p. 45.
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creditors to seize debtor’s assets, and cessation of gar 
nishment of wages or dunning notices which may cost 
debtor his job;
(d) fulfillment of debtor’s desire to pay debts;
(e) education of debtor in budgeting and family finance 
which could avert repetitive insolvency.
Advantages to the creditors
(a) payment, which though in installments is better than 
the risk of only a small partial payment or no payment 
at all which is so often the case in straight bankruptcy 
proceedings by wage earners;
(b) the bankruptcy court acts as his collection agent.11
That the use of the counselling staff to facilitate use of the 
wage earner plan has paid dividends during the short period 
since its inception in the Madison District in mid-1960 is evi 
denced by the amounts paid to the creditors thereunder. In 
1960 creditors were paid $2,153; in 1961, they were paid $30,163; 
and in excess of $100,000 was paid in 1962. Creditors who once 
favored immediate liquidation of the debtor’s assets have grown 
to appreciate the potential of a plan which recognizes earning 
power as well as assets and which assists debtors in fulfilling 
their moral obligations.
Though the wage earner plan has been in the law since 1938, 
it is only recently that its real potential has come to light, 
though for years the Judicial Conference of the United States 
has advocated its use and effectiveness. The Consumer Bank 
ruptcy Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and 
Business Law of the American Bar Association has appointed 
a sub-committee to arrange and encourage workshops, sem 
inars, and forums and to publish papers designed to educate 
those who should be concerned with the merits of the Chap 
ter XIII proceeding.
The National Bankruptcy Conference, the National Associa 
tion of Referees in Bankruptcy, and others have joined the 
Judicial Conference of the United States and the American
“Riley, op. cit., p. 56.
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Bar Association in recognizing the importance of the Chapter 
XIII proceeding. It may be that Chapter XIII has come into 
its own at last, and that a combination of exigency, ingenuity 
and time will shape the application of the wage earner plan 
into a solution for the problem which has been bothering the 
commercial world since long before the advent of written laws.
What Everybody Wants to Know 
About Deficit Spending
“This is a doubtful tale from faery land,
Hard for the non-elect to understand.”
John Keats, Lamia
ROBERT F. WALLACE, Chairman 
Department of Economics 
Montana State University, Missoula
When the Practical Man reads that the President’s proposed 
tax cut is purposely planned to create a deliberate budgetary 
deficit, he is quite naturally puzzled. Such a proposal violates 
common sense. Surely no individual or household can spend 
itself rich; nor can it continue forever to incur deficits which 
result in an ever larger debt which is never to be repaid. Yet 
for the whole nation, strange as it may seem, exactly the oppo 
site is true. A nation can enrich itself only by spending. More 
over, if a nation’s deficits are too small and its total debts, both 
public and private, grow too slowly, that nation’s income, out 
put, and employment will surely decline. Actual reduction in 
total debt would result in major disaster. This occurred in the 
United States on a grand scale only from 1930 to 1933, the per 
iod known as The Great Depression. By contrast, from 1946 to 
1962, an era of unequalled prosperity, our total debt increased 
from less than $400 billion to more than $1,000 billion.1
These are not opinions, but rather the elementary facts of 
our national accounts, the ABC’s of economics. But the unfor 
tunate situation is that most people have not had an opportun 
ity to study the relevant relationships in a systematic fashion; 
nor are they familiar with the sources of statistical informa 
tion which would enable them to test impressions and opin 
ions against facts. The result is that popular concepts, at vari 
ance with readily verifiable facts, interfere with meaningful
’See Table 1.
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discussion of this crucial problem of public policy. For exam 
ple, the popular conception of recent trends in Federal debt 
may perhaps be fairly described as follows: While private 
businesses and individuals have been conducting their finan 
cial affairs in a generally careful and circumspect manner, 
uncontrolled Government spending, especially at the Federal 
level, has caused huge deficits resulting in what Time magazine 
calls, “the bloating national debt.”2 
Some of the facts as opposed to popular concepts, are shown 
in Table 1. There it may be seen that from 1946 to 1962, net 
private debt of corporations and individuals increased by 336 
percent, while net Federal debt increased by 12 percent. A 429 
percent increase in state and local debt suggests that if any 
public debt has been out of control it is the debt of the folks 
back home and not that incurred by the Bureaucrats in Wash 
ington. And, in daily references to “crushing taxes,” how often 
does the press remind us that the only tax rates that have not 
been raised since the war, the only tax rates that have actually 
been reduced, are those of the Federal Government for gen 
eral revenue? Yet such are the facts as contrasted with the
TABLE 1
SOME COMPARISONS OF DEBT, 1946-1962 
(billions of dollars)
Source: Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress 
January 1963, pp. 171, 234-235. Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1950, 
p. 61, January 1963, p. 38. Moody’s Public Utility Manual and The Wall 
Street Journal, February 20, 1963, p. 4.
^January 25,1963, p. 12.
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1946 210.7 229.7 109 259.5 13.6 154.1 397.4 1.7 139.0
1962 553.9 256.8 46 304.0 72.0 671.9 1000.7 8.2 256.1
% increase
1946-1962 163 12   17 429 336 152 382 84
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folklore. The result is that public debate of planned deficit 
spending seldom involves the real issues.
The frequently absurd pronouncements of the Practical Man 
are received by professional economists with feelings ranging 
all the way from tolerant amusement to despair, depending 
on the prominence of the speaker. The Practical Man, drawing 
on the usually reliable lessons of personal experience, seeks 
to relate national conduct to principles which are unquestion 
ably valid in the management of a household, or a corner gro 
cery store. He sees in the opposing position, at best, mater 
ial for ridicule and, at worst, moral decay. Like Henny Penny 
who, according to nursery tradition, panicked the other barn 
yard fowls with her cry, “The sky is falling,” he has been 
shouting in the streets for thirty years that our financial skies 
are falling, or at least in danger of falling. But unlike Ducky 
Lucky and Turkey Lurkey, his listeners have paid no atten 
tion whatever to his warning. Meanwhile disaster has appeared 
to recede into the distance as the nation grows steadily in 
wealth and income. Evidently other more pragmatic men are 
willing to accept present bliss at the cost of eventual perdition, 
especially since the day of reckoning seems indefinitely post- 
poneable.
The most unfortunate aspect of the situation is not merely 
that formal logical error invalidates the particular objections 
which the Practical Man chooses to make, though this is 
usually the case. The pity is that he is wrong when he might 
he right, that he makes little if any contribution when there is 
much that he could contribute. Economic analysis reveals that 
there may be valid grounds for his objections, or at least that 
there may be other solutions which could remove or minimize 
the economic stagnation which is the heart of the problem. 
But unfamiliarity with relevant principles causes him to 
make the wrong objections on the wrong grounds and involves 
him in gross logical error which his professional adversaries 
are not slow to point out. Thus his considerable ability is wasted 
on false issues while important questions of public policy are 
neglected or at least not related to the matter of Federal defi 
cits to which they may be highly relevant. Our friend has 
brought down no birds these thirty years, for the simple
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reason that he has been firing blanks! But the birds are there.
In this article the reader is asked to lay aside temporarily the 
value judgments drawn from personal experience and, for the 
sake of analysis, to look at the world from what may be an 
unfamiliar point of view. Like the churchmen who were out 
raged by Galileo’s denial that the sun moves around the earth, 
he may feel that he is being asked not to believe his own eyes. 
What, then, is this strange logic? How can we spend ourselves 
rich? How can unending deficits and their consequence, ever 
growing debts, be essential to the economic health of a nation?
The Role of Spending 
We begin with a simple fact on which all can agree. Our real 
national income in any given year can be no more than the 
total of all the goods and services produced during that year. 
We call it our gross national product, or simply GNP. In order 
to measure the product we could conceivably take an inven 
tory and list it item by item. But the bewildering variety and 
astronomical numbers involved would soon demonstrate the 
impracticability of this method. We might try weighing every 
thing or perhaps estimating cubic content, but such reckoning 
would, of course, be meaningless. The only meaningful measure 
is in dollars and cents. We only ask, “What was paid for it?” 
Thus at the very outset we see an essential relation between 
total output and total spending. Spending is our measure of 
output. Output is defined in terms of spending. But the rela 
tionship goes deeper. There is a causal connection. Spending 
creates or causes output since it is clear that nobody produces 
anything in a free market system, unless he is paid for it. And 
here another key relationship becomes apparent. Spending 
creates income as well as output. Nobody can receive money 
income unless someone else has spent money. The fundamental 
relationships can therefore be summarized by the undeniable 
proposition that spending creates income and output. They can 
be generated in no other way. Spending is just another word 
for what economists call “demand.” What businessmen call 
“sales” (their source of income) obviously depends on the 
spending of their customers.
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Recognition of these basic facts immediately throws a dif 
ferent light on national spending habits. When we see the 
statement that the American people are on a sort of spree, 
spending more and more every year, this is no cause for alarm. 
On the contrary, we can only breathe a fervent, “Thank 
Heaven!” For if our total spending stops growing, our produc 
tion and sales stop growing. The nation stops growing.
These are the fundamental accounting principles on the 
basis of which national income and output are measured by 
the United States Department of Commerce and by the gov 
ernments of all nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain. If the 
reader picks up a copy of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, avail-
TABLE 2
NATIONAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE, 1962
(billions of dollars)
Income Receipts
Compensation of employees ..............................................      321.6
Proprietors’ income _______________________________________  49.8
Business and professional __________    36.8
F a r m ----------------------------------------------  13.0
Rental income of persons_____________________________  12.8
Corporate p ro fits_________________ ______ _________ ___ 51.0
Net in terest_______________________________________     22.2
Capital consumption allow ance_____________________________  47.6
Indirect business tax liab ility______________________________  51.6
Business transfer payments ___________   2.1
Statistical discrepancy and adjustments________________ —4.8
Charges against Gross National Product (Gross National
I n c o m e )---------------------------------------- ...___ ;________ ... 553.9
Expenditures
Personal consumption expenditure .......    356.7
Goods ------------------------------;_______________________  209.5
Services_____  ______________    147.1
Gross private investm ent...............................................    79.9
Domestic ____________________________________  76.6
F o re ig n ______________________________  ” 33
Government purchases of goods and services...... ............. 117.3
Federal _____________________________________  62.3
State and lo c a l________________________________ ___ 55 0
Gross National Product or Expenditure_______________ 553.9
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1963, pp. 
260-261.
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able at every national bank, or the Survey of Current Business, 
found in most libraries, he can himself verify the procedures 
described here. He will find the GNP table labeled “Gross 
National Product or Expenditure.”
It is convenient for analytical purposes to separate the total 
spending into three classes: (1) spending by consumers for 
consumer goods and services, (2) spending by investors for 
additions to our real capital wealth and, (3) spending by Gov 
ernment for goods and services. The total spending represents 
payment for the gross national product and can be traced to 
the various recipients as income, or, alternatively, as charges 
against the total output. As an example, the actual record for 
the United States in 1962 is shown in Table 2, which presents 
a highly simplified summary of the national income and prod 
uct accounts for that year.
The Role of Deficit Spending and Debt
Having demonstrated the point that a nation can get rich 
only by spending—in fact under a free market system could 
not produce so much as a toothpick without spending—we 
must now show the extent to which spending in turn depends 
on deficits and growing debt. We shall demonstrate the fact 
that spending, which creates income and output, cannot be 
maintained without continuing deficits. At the outset, in order 
to clarify general principles, we shall consider not merely Fed 
eral Government deficits, but total deficits, including Govern 
ment. The Government is only one of many possible deficit 
spenders among the various economic units. In fact, as pointed 
out earlier, its deficits since World War II have represented 
only a tiny proportion of total deficits of all economic units. 
After analyzing the deficit operations of economic units—indi 
viduals, business enterprises, and Government—we may then 
ask what special characteristics, if any, may be attributed to 
those of the Federal Government.
We start with the proposition that the income of each and 
every economic unit is the result of spending by other units 
and that the aggregate income of all economic units is there 
fore equal to the total spending of a given period, say a year.
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With the exception of a negligibly few economic units whose 
income in a given period is exactly equal to expenditure all 
units can be divided into two classes, surplus units and deficit 
units. Since the operations of the few “balanced budget” units 
are completely neutral in their effect on total spending, tend 
ing neither to increase it nor to decrease it, their influence 
may be ignored in our analysis. Therefore subject to the excep 
tion noted, every individual, business enterprise, or Govern 
ment must fit into one of these two classes. Either the economic 
unit spends less than its income and is a surplus unit, or it 
spends more and is a deficit unit. And income is, of course, the 
point of reference since, obviously, the concept of a surplus 
or deficit has no meaning except as it relates to an income of 
a given size during a given accounting period.
At this point the consequences of a corollary fact must be 
noted. Just as the income of a particular economic unit depends 
on the spending of other units, so the spending of each unit 
creates income for others. The related role of surplus and 
deficit units now becomes apparent. Surplus units receive or 
take out from the income stream more than they put back. 
Deficit units put into the income stream more than they take 
out. Thus we note a fundamental accounting identity: In a 
national income of a given size total deficits are necessarily 
exactly equal to total surpluses. The key importance of this 
identity is that it enables us to grasp the following fact: If the 
deficit units by their spending return to the income stream 
less than the surplus units take out of the stream, the total 
level of spending and income must fall. It is this fact which 
explains the necessity for deficits.
Now let us state these formal accounting relationships in 
more familiar language. The surpluses are more commonly 
known as savings and the deficits as investment spending. 
Money saved represents a withdrawal from the income stream. 
The impact of such savings, or “non-spending,” taken by itself 
is deflationary. The effect is to reduce sales and the demand 
for goods. Other things being equal, it is clear that these sav 
ings must cause the spending stream to drop unless there is 
some way to put them back.
The way in which the surplus funds of the savers usually
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get back into the spending-income stream is for the deficit units 
to borrow the savings and spend them for the production of 
real investment assets—new plants, new machines, larger 
inventory, and other actual additions to the nation’s wealth.
The necessity for continuous deficits and ever growing debt 
now becames clear. If the savings of the surplus units who 
spend less than they receive are not borrowed and spent for 
investment by deficit units who spend more than they receive, 
the funds withheld are lost from the income stream. If this 
happens total spending, income, and output must fall by an 
amount exactly equal to the excess of the total surpluses over 
the total deficits. Since savers do not usually spend their own 
savings to produce capital goods but instead lend them to busi 
ness enterprises which spend the funds for construction of such 
new equipment, the process necessarily involves borrowing and 
lending, usually with the aid of a wide variety of financial 
intermediary institutions such as commercial and investment 
banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance companies. 
The essential point is that except for savers who do their own 
investment spending, every new act of saving and lending, 
which results in spending for economic growth necessarily 
involves an addition to total debt.
A note of explanation regarding terminology is necessary 
here. By investment we do not mean what the average person 
thinks of as investment. Investment here means actual spend 
ing for the construction of a capital asset, or the acquisition of 
new inventory which also adds to wealth. By savings we mean 
funds withheld from spending for consumption and made 
available for production of new capital. What most people call 
their “investments” are really savings in the economic sense. 
When a saver purchases a security, a savings and loan share, 
or an insurance policy, or deposits his money in a bank this does 
not necessarily mean that these savings will actually be spent 
to produce new investment goods.
In fact, this is the heart of the problem. Savings decisions 
and investment decisions in the economic sense are not made 
by the same people. Every person with income must decide 
whether or not to save and, if so, how much. But decisions to 
invest are made only by the relatively few people responsible
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for the management of American free enterprise. If a saver 
buys a secondhand security the money will not be returned to 
the income stream and nothing will be added to the nation s 
wealth if the seller uses the proceeds to increase his liquidity. 
No investment takes place in the economic sense unless the 
security has been newly issued by an enterprise which spends 
the money to produce actual new capital goods. In the same 
way funds “invested” in a savings deposit result in no real 
investment if the bank simply allows its reserve ratio to 
increase. Deflationary, sales-destroying surpluses of savers 
are redeemed for the income stream only when enterprises 
acting as deficit units borrow these funds and spend them 
for construction of real additions to our wealth. This conclusion 
is probably consistent with the intuitive feeling of most read 
ers that the nation’s real wealth cannot be increased merely 
by passing financial instruments from hand to hand.
The only exception to the necessity for borrowing relates 
to the savings of individuals and businesses who themselves 
spend for investment assets. If a man saves enough money 
during the year to add a room to his house he has both saved 
and invested. There is no effect on total spending or income. 
The substantial retained earnings which American corpora 
tions invest in new plant and equipment constitute a more 
important example. In such cases the problem considered here 
does not arise. The saver himself spends for investment. How 
ever, most savings get back into the income stream only when 
deficit units through financial intermediaries borrow and 
spend them.
The mystery of a healthy economy in spite of skyrocketing 
debt need no longer puzzle us. Growing debt is clearly essential 
to continued health. A nation cannot get richer without saving, 
any more than an individual can. We cannot grow if all of our 
output is consumed each year. Savers, by abstaining from 
spending a part of their incomes, in effect release some of the 
nation’s resources from the production of consumer goods. The 
resources so released are thereby made available to enterprises 
for producing capital goods which add to the nation’s wealth. 
But if enterprises as deficit units do not borrow the unspent 
funds and hence do not use them to produce investment goods,
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efforts to save become abortive. The resources released from 
production of consumer goods are simply unemployed. There 
can be no real savings without corresponding investment, that 
is, deficit spending. A nation’s real savings, the real increases 
in its wealth during a given year, cannot be more than that 
part of its total output which it did not consume. In other words, 
the investment goods which it produces above and beyond 
the things consumed are a measure both of its savings and of 
its investment. Efforts to save more than enterprises are wil 
ling to borrow and invest simply result in reduced income, out 
put, employment, and profits. Hence the amount of saving a 
nation can do without impoverishing itself is limited by the 
total amount of deficits which it finds desirable and profitable 
to incur. “Thus, Thrift may be the handmaid and nurse of 
Enterprise. But equally she may not. And, perhaps, even 
usually she is not. For enterprise is connected with thrift not 
directly but at one remove; and the link which should join 
them is frequently missing. For the engine which drives Enter 
prise is not Thrift, but Profit.”3 We conclude that if continued 
deficits and growing debt are “unnecessary” this is true only in 
the sense that unemployment, unsold goods, business losses, 
and decreasing rates of growth offer an alternative.
A Deficit Spending Model
A simple arithmetical model of an imaginary nation’s eco 
nomic system will help make the above points clear. Let us 
first consider the operations of a system where there is no 
Government activity at all, just as in the discussion above we 
made no distinction between Government and other spending 
activity. Having examined the basic properties of a private 
enterprise system without Government we can add Govern 
ment activity later and note whatever changes it may intro 
duce.
Money can be spent in only two ways, for consumption, C, 
and for investment, I, so that C plus I equals total spending
Keynes, John Maynard, A Treatise on Money, Vol. II, Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, New York. 1930. ». 14fl.
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which of course equals total income, Y, and in turn measures 
gross national product, GNP. Hence,
C +  I =  Y =  GNP 1
This can be read, “gross national expenditure equals gross 
national income equals gross national product.” The reader 
will recognize that except for the absence of Government 
expenditure this is in the format of Table 2 taken from the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. The nation’s income is generated 
by the two kinds of spending; but, once received, its disposition 
is a different matter. Since there are no taxes, the people can 
dispose of their income, Y, in only two ways. Either it is spent 
for consumption, C, or it is saved, S, so that ,
Y — C =  S, or Y =  C +  S
Note that decisions to save or consume are made by everyone 
who has income to dispose of while the decisions to spend for 
investment goods, I, are made only by a relatively small group 
of people. They are the owners and managers of business 
enterprises and the amount of the investment spending they 
plan to do will depend on their estimates of the prospects for 
realizing a profit from such investment spending.
Since these two groups do not include all of the same people 
it would be the merest accident if total plans to save were 
equal to total plans to invest. Yet we have noted that real sav 
ings cannot be different from real investment. They are in fact 
two words for the same thing. Also it is clear from our income 
creation equation,
C +  I =  Y
and from our income disposal equation,
C +  S =  Y
that S and I must be equal to each other. But they are equal only 
in the ex post, or realized sense. In an ex ante or planned sense, 
as noted above, plans to save may differ from plans to invest. 
At this point we may recall the accounting identity which 
states that with an income of a given size total surpluses are 
necessarily exactly equal to total deficits. Income has no voli-
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tion or life of its own. It is the result of spending decisions by 
human beings exercising volition. Income is the resultant. 
This is in the ex post sense. To explain income and output we 
have to account for the spending decisions which cause them 
to be what they are. This will become apparent as we examine 
the operations of Model I below. The nation begins each income 
period, a week, a month, or a year, with a certain income which 
has been generated by the two types of spending. The people 
can then dispose of that income either by spending it for con 
sumption or by withholding it as savings. Planned or expected 
magnitudes are on the left side of our model. Actual or realized 
magnitudes and resulting debt are shown on the right. On the 
left, or plans, side we find the people’s plans to dispose of a 
given income, the relevant relationship being summarized by 
the column headings, Y — C =  S. Plans to invest are shown 
under the column headed I. Of the four planned or expected 
magnitudes only C and I are solid, for they involve spending 
decisions which the individuals have power to make. Nobody 
can really say for certain and in advance what his income or 
savings will be in the end. But he can decide to spend. Under 
the actual or realized magnitudes the key relationships are 
again summarized by the column headings C +  I =  Y. In other 
words income depends on spending and nothing else. If it 
makes the analysis clearer the reader may, if he wishes, 
assume that planned income at the beginning of each period is 
the income actually earned during the previous period and 
available for disposal in the current period. This is perhaps 
the most simple possible assumption and is also realistic since 
the income available for disposition in a given period usually 
depends on what was earned in a previous period. However, 
there is no reason why greater or lesser income could not be 
expected, with spending plans modified accordingly. The ar 
rows connecting the two Y’s are meant to show that we make 
here the simplifying assumption that people plan to spend or 
save in the current period what was received or earned in the 
last. The periods assumed here are “years” though obviously 
they could as well be “weeks” or “months.” In order to simplify 
the analysis we assume that there is no growth in population 
and no advance in technology.
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During the first two periods, everything runs smoothly since 
it is assumed that planned surpluses do not exceed planned 
deficits. Each year the $100 billion of savings are borrowed 
by the investors and returned to the income stream. Because 
income holds up, planned money savings of $100 billion result 
in real savings for the country, as actual capital goods are pro 
duced in the amount of $100 billion. Since this is the amount 
saved and lent, debt rises by $100 billion each year as a neces 
sary result.
In year 3, things go wrong. Plans to consume and save are 
unchanged but, for whatever reason, estimates of profit oppor 
tunities deteriorate and investors plan to spend only $80 billion. 
Since only spending counts, income must drop too. But actual 
real savings cannot be more than $80 billion if only $80 billion 
is spent for construction of new capital goods. Additions to real 
wealth cannot exceed the difference between total production 
and consumption. How can this be so if the savers actually 
saved $100 billion and can show securities, deposit slips, and 
similar instruments to prove it? The answer is that a part of 
these savings, $20 billion to be exact, were offset by losses, 
mainly negative profits, of those who suffered declining in 
come. We are concerned with the total savings of the nation, 




Expected Amounts Realized or Actual Amounts
Change Total
Year Y — C =  S I C +  I =  Y S in debt debt
1 500 400 100 100 400 100 500 100 +100 100
_________________________  I
4-
2 500 400 100 100 400 100 500 100 +100 200II
I
3 500 400 100 80 400 80 480 80 +  80 280
2 500 400 100 100 400 100 500 100 +100 200
__________|
4.
3a 500 400 400 -120 400 120 520 120 +120 320
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losses as well as the gains. Income has fallen to $480 billion and 
these losses have made the sum of total surpluses exactly equal 
to the sum of total deficits as it must be. Total demand has fal 
len by $20 billion compared with year 2, productive resources 
capable of producing $20 billion in output are wasted in unem 
ployment and, of course, the foregone output is lost forever.
Let us now consider what would happen if the managers of 
business enterprises see such favorable prospects for profit 
that in year 3 they plan to invest $120 billion, while consum 
ers still plan to spend $400 billion and save only $100 billion.
In order to show the effects of such a development all of the 
magnitudes for year 2 are duplicated in the table, the only dif 
ference being in our alternate assumptions for year 3 which 
is designated 3a. The results are just the opposite of those which 
followed when plans to invest fell short of planned savings. 
Since actual spending is now increased by $20 billion, total 
demand, in other words total spending, has risen to $520 billion. 
Debt has of course increased by $120 billion instead of $100 
billion. If population growth and advancement of technology 
have provided corresponding additional productive resources, 
the increased spending results in real increases in output. On 
the other hand, if corresponding productive resources are not 
forthcoming, increased spending cannot cause increased out 
put. It only raises the price tag. We get not more goods but 
only more expensive goods. We call it inflation. In either case 
the increased investment spending causes savings to be in 
creased correspondingly as money incomes increase beyond 
expectations. These are real savings if increased output has 
been possible. If not their real value has been dissipated by 
higher prices.
The workings of the model have now clarified its essential 
properties as they relate to spending, deficits, and debt. To 
maintain an income of a given size, total deficits in each year 
must be exactly equal to total surpluses for that year and, of 
course, each year’s deficit adds an equal amount to debt. Defi 
cits equal to surpluses will only maintain a given level of 
income from year to year. Income will not fall but it will not 
rise either. This would be a static world. In the real world 
where growing population and advances in technology make
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possible ever-growing output, total spending must increase 
from year to year. To provide higher levels of spending, 
planned deficits must grow in size each year and must be 
greater than planned surpluses. The ever larger deficits in 
excess of planned savings are financed by the banking system 
which creates new money for the purpose. However, mere 
willingness of the banking system to lend does not assure that 
adequate additional money will be borrowed and spent. Deficit 
spenders must see advantage in such borrowing and this means 
that they must have reasonable expectations of profit. The 
appropriate rate of increase in money supply and in the level 
of spending depends upon how rapidly corresponding increases 
in real output are possible. If money supply and spending grow 
more rapidly than the rate at which new productive resources 
become available we have inflation. On the other hand, if they 
grow more slowly than population and other resources we have 
rising rates of unemployment and economic stagnation. Thus 
we see that spending, deficits, and debt in a free market society 
may grow either too rapidly or too slowly, but grow they must. 
It was only for the purpose of clarifying the role of deficits 
and surpluses in our model that we made the assumption of 
fixed population and static technology.
The Role of Government Deficits 
We have seen that a free enterprise market economy cannot 
operate and grow without deficits and expanding debt. It has 
also become clear that since the rate of growth of deficits and 
debt is determined by the independent decisions of millions 
of free individuals subject to no central planning or control, 
deficits may grow either too slowly, in which case we have 
recession, or too rapidly, in which case we have inflation. This 
is simply a description of the manner in which our economy 
operates. It is based on accounting identities and involves no 
value judgments or moral principles. For good or ill, it is the 
way things are. We have seen that this is so even in the 
absence of any Government at all. In contrast to Model I 
where no Government existed let us now introduce Govern- 
ment operations into the picture.
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First we must note the relationship between Government 
deficits and surpluses and those of the private economy. Let 
Government spending be represented by G and taxes by T. 
Then as we saw in Table 2 which presented national income 
data for 1962 the spending-income equation for the real world 
includes Government spending and must be written,
C + I + G = Y
In the real world we also note that since people must pay 
taxes they cannot devote all of their income either to con 
sumption or savings. They can spend for consumption only 
what is left after paying taxes. Planned savings will be the 
remainder. The real world income disposal equation can there 
fore be written
Y — T — C =  S, or C +  S +  T =  Y
Now if
and if
C +  I +  G =  Y
C +  S -f  T =  Y
it follows that, being equal to the same thing, they are neces 
sarily equal to each other .We can then write
C + I + G = C + S + T
Removing the C’s by cancellation we get
I + G = S + T
Changing the sign of our T and bringing it over with the G in 
order to place Government spending and taxes together we get
I +  (G -  T) =  S.
This is our fundamental deficit-surplus equation for the whole 
economy where Government deficits and surpluses are taken 
into account along with those of the private sector. Like our 
original deficit-surplus equation, I =  S, it is purely descriptive. 
It is also an accounting identity involving no value judgments 
or questions of right and wrong, desirable or undesirable. If 
Government spending exceeds taxes we have a Government
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deficit. In this case (G — T) is positive and is added to I, the 
private deficit, thereby increasing the total flow of spending. 
Together the two represent the total deficit which must equal 
S, the total surplus. On the other hand, if tax receipts exceed 
Government spending we have a budgetary surplus. In the 
equation this surplus, which actually represents Government 
savings, will have a negative sign and will be subtracted from 
I, the private deficits. Such a surplus is, of course, an offset to 
private deficit spending and like any savings tends to be defla 
tionary. Thus in a period when private deficits grow too rap 
idly and tend to create inflationary pressures, a Government 
surplus, by withholding from the income stream more than 
it puts back, can be used to exercise a dampening effect on 
total demand and is anti-inflationary.
Let us now organize our model in a more realistic format 
in which Government taxing and spending operations are in 
cluded. As in Model I, the column headings indicate relevant re 
lationships. It is again assumed that spending plans are related 
to income earned in the previous period. An important differ 
ence in regard to plans is that planned consumption will bear an 
inverse relationship to taxes. The. lower the taxes, the more 
consumers are able to spend. Since plans to invest depend on 
prospects for profit, which in turn have some relationship to 
consumer spending, it is likely that plans to invest will also 
be stimulated by tax reductions and repressed by tax increases. 
However, in order to clarify the workings of our model, let 
us first make the simplifying assumption that only consumption 
plans are affected by tax changes. We shall also assume the 
most favorable possible situation from the Government’s view 
point, namely, that all of any new consumer income made 
available by a tax cut will be spent on consumption, and that 
none of it will be added to savings (although there is clearly 
the possibility, or even likelihood, that some may be saved). 
It is also likely that investment plans may be directly stimu 
lated by tax cuts, but we leave this possibility aside for the 
moment. For the sake of simplicity we again assume static 
population and technology.
Everything here operates in much the same way as in the 
more simple model where Government was absent. In the first
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model, the people used their money to buy the output of priv 
ate enterprises and received in exchange finished consumer 
goods or titles to capital goods. Unless they could buy such 
things from private firms, there were no roads, no schools, no 
courts, no police, no fire departments, no sanitary facilities, 
no mail service, no military establishment, nor any other pub 
lic services. In our real world model the people are able to buy 
such services from the Government. In addition to the goods 
and services purchased from the private sector of the economy 
by paying cash or credit, the people now buy these other 
things from the public sector by paying taxes. The main differ 
ence is that whereas the things people buy at the “private 
store” are determined by daily voting (in the form of dollars); 
what they buy at the “public store” is determined by less fre 
quent voting, But, of course, in either case the effect is the 
same. The people themselves determine how much they wish 
to obtain from private enterprise in exchange for cash or 
credit and how much from Government in exchange for taxes.
But, now let us note an important difference in the two 
models. In Model I total deficits and surpluses resulted from 
the independent decisions of millions of free individuals. If 
plans to invest were inadequate to absorb planned savings the 
result was that spending, income, and output inevitably fell, 
causing unemployment and recession. When planned deficits 
grew more rapidly than planned surpluses, spending increased 
and, if productive resources were not forthcoming at cor 
responding rates, inflation was the result. In the real world, 
since Government is also able to run deficits or surpluses, its 
fiscal operations afford a possible cushion against the unde 
sirable effects of excessive private deficits or surpluses.
Turning now to developments in Model II we assume that, 
as in Model I, everything goes smoothly during the first two 
years. Planned private deficits equal to planned private sur 
pluses maintain the level of spending and income. Since the 
Government budget is balanced at $100 billion there is no Gov 
ernment deficit or surplus and this, of course, is as it should be 
if the stability of the economy is not to be disturbed. A bal 
anced budget in this situation is necessary. Government debt 
is zero and remains zero. Total debt, still made up entirely of
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private debt, increases by $100 billion each year, the rate neces 
sary to absorb private surpluses. But again in the third year 
things are assumed to go wrong. Private deficit spending of 
$80 billion is insufficient to absorb planned private surpluses 
of $100 billion and, since the Government continues to maintain 
a balanced budget, there is no public deficit to absorb the 
excess surpluses. Therefore total spending, income, output, 
and the rate of growth of debt all fall by $20 billion, the amount 
by which planned surpluses exceed planned deficits.
Now consider the lower section of Model II where we again 
reproduce years 2 and 3 but with a different fiscal policy. 
Private deficit spending has declined but in this case the Gov 
ernment does not maintain a balanced budget. In order to 
offset a decline of $20 billion in private deficits it cuts taxes by 
$20 billion, thereby incurring a public deficit of $20 billion. 
Thus total deficits, including Government deficit, are equal 
to total planned surpluses and the spending-income stream is 
maintained. Though private debt fails to grow at the requi 
site rate of $100 billion per year increasing public debt fills the 
gap and maintains the rate of total spending and total demand 
undiminished.
According to the assumptions made earlier, all of the in 
creased disposable income made available by the tax cut is 
used to increase consumption spending. In the real world, as 
noted earlier, some of the increase in disposable income would 
certainly be used to pay debts or to increase savings. To the 
extent that this occurs, an even greater tax cut and a larger 
government deficit would be necessary in order to maintain 
the original level of spending. Although cutting taxes might 
at first seem to be a more conservative way to create a deficit 
than by increased government spending, the fact is that a 
given change in the level of income can be achieved by a 
smaller deficit if it is accomplished through a change in spend 
ing. A billion dollar increase in Government spending adds a 
billion dollars directly to the income stream, but part of a bil 
lion dollar tax cut will be saved or used to pay debts.
The assumption that all income freed by the tax cut went 
into additional consumption was made only to simplify the 
arithmetic. In all probability some would go into increased
80 MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY
investment spending. In the real world, the actual distribution 
between additional consumption and additional investment 
would depend on a wide variety of factors such as the distribu 
tion of the tax cut benefits, consumer optimism or pessimism, 
business estimates of profit prospects, and probably even the 
public attitude toward Government deficit spending and pub 
lic debt.
The role of Government deficits can now be summarized 
in the same mechanical accounting terminology employed in 
describing deficits in general. Provided that planned private 
deficits are inadequate to absorb planned private surpluses, 
the alternative to a Government deficit sufficient to absorb 
the difference is declining income, output, and employment. 
This proposition is a purely descriptive statement of fact in 
which no matter of opinion or value judgment is involved. 
The point is that there must be total deficits of a given size 
somewhere in the economy if total spending and total demand 
are to be maintained. Hence, if sufficient deficits cannot be 
coaxed from the private sector, either these deficits must 
appear in the public sector or spending, income, and output 
inevitably will decline. Business sales will fall, profits will 
disappear and goods will remain unsold. In this situation the 
public must understand that either Government deficit spend 
ing or unemployment and recession are inescapable alterna 
tives. The only value judgment involved is in the determina 
tion of which is to be preferred. But, since it is a value judg 
ment, the economist as economist cannot decide for the people 
which is the better choice. His only function is to let people 
know where each of the two paths leads.
Government Deficits: Plan or No Plan
Up to this point the term “planned Government deficit” has 
been used in a context which implied a deliberate and con 
scious adjustment of the Federal budget to offset excessive or 
inadequate private deficits. The idea was that since planned 
private deficits and surpluses are the product of decentralized 
decision-making it would be mainly accidental if they hap 
pened to occur regularly in just the “right” amounts to main-
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tain full employment without inflation. Hence approximately 
right ’ total amounts could be assured by central planning 
of Government deficits or surpluses which would provide the 
necessary increases or decreases in the spending stream. As 
an interpretation of actual Government policy in modern 
United States, such a concept would be naive indeed. Such has 
not been the case. It is true that President Roosevelt experi 
mented with small planned deficits during parts of his first 
two terms. But he was not firmly convinced of the wisdom of 
such policies, and as a result refused to use most of the great 
powers given him by the Thomas Rider to the Farm Bill in 
1933. During his eight years in office prior to 1941, most of his 
budget deficits were not markedly larger than the last deficit 
of $2.7 billion incurred by President Hoover; two were smaller, 
$2.6 and $1.2 billion, and two were about the same size. The 
largest was $4.4 billion in 1936.4 In the face of the threat posed 
by a business recession, President Eisenhower in 1954 recog 
nized the basic concepts in a remarkable statement:
The fourth principle is to act promptly and vigorously if eco- 
nomic conditions require it. The Government will not hesitate 
to make greater use of monetary, debt management, and credit 
policy, including liberalized use of Federal insurance of private 
obligations, or to modify the tax structure, or to reduce taxes, 
or to expand on a large scale useful public works, or to take any 
other steps that may be necessary. The Government must and 
will be ready to deal with any contingencies that may arise. An 
essential part of this preparedness under present circumstances 
is a higher Federal debt limit which is already necessary for the 
efficient conduct of the Government’s current operations.5
Frequent public pronouncements since that time, however, 
suggest that the above did not represent President Eisenhow 
er s personal views. The recent publications and statements 
of President Kennedy’s advisors probably represent the first 
clear espousal and recommendation of a planned Federal defi 
cit with full Presidential approval. The reader may protest 
that a great many Federal deficits during recessions of the 
postwar period were received by Administrations in Washing-
Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress January 
I • : 1963, p. 238.
Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress January 
28,1954, p.113.
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ton with acquiescence and even approval. It was true that 
President Eisenhower’s recession deficits amounted to $9.5 bil 
lion in 1953 and $12.5 billion in 1959. But this does not mean 
that the Administration “planned” these deficits. We can only 
say that they did not plan not to have them. In other words, 
when recession brought declining revenues, there was no effort 
to prevent this from causing a deficit. The important point 
here is that during a recession, unless extremely vigorous 
remedial steps are taken, a Government deficit occurs auto 
matically. As national spending and income fall, Government
CHART I
FEDERAL BUDGET AND BUSINESS CAPITAL ACCOUNT: 
SURPLUSES OR DEFICITS, 1947-1962
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'Surplus or deficit ( —) on national income accounts basis.
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tax revenues decline, while Government outlays for unemploy 
ment benefits, farm price supports, loans, welfare, and other 
assistance increase. A Government deficit is the passive result. 
We do not have to plan a deficit because it occurs anyway. 
But affirmative action and planning would be necessary at 
such times if we decided that the budget should be balanced. 
To achieve a balanced budget we would have to raise tax rates 
or impose new taxes on the one hand and cut Government 
spending on the other. This would balance the budget but it 
would, of course, also cause further declines in spending, in 
come, and output. And, as usual in such cases, business profits 
would be the first casualty.
An automatic inverse relationship between the Federal 
budget and business capital account is shown in Chart 1. Move 
ments of the business capital account toward deficit or surplus 
shown by the solid line reflect differences between retained 
earnings and gross private domestic investment, while similiar 
movements of the Federal budget on national income account 
are shown by the dotted line. It should be clearly understood 
that a “deficit” on business capital account does not mean that 
business is unprofitable. On the contrary it implies favorable 
expectations. The term is used here in the sense of investment 
spending for new capital goods in excess of business’s own 
savings. Obviously the stimulus for such deficit spending is 
a favorable prospect for profit.
As explained in the recent Economic Report of the President, 
The chart shows clearly that movements in the deficits and 
surpluses of these two sectors bear a marked inverse relation 
ship. . . . The budget of the business sector exhibits surpluses 
or small deficits in years of recession and slack, moves toward 
deficit as the economy expands, and commonly achieves a sub 
stantial deficit in years of prosperity and low unemployment 
• ■ ■ The Federal budget shows a reverse pattern. It consistently 
moves toward a surplus as the economy expands and toward a 
deficit as it contracts. These movements are mainly a passive 
result of the operation of the automatic fiscal stabilizers . .
In conclusion we find that we really have three choices of
Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress January 
1963, pp. 76-77.
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fiscal policy. First, we could plan and vigorously execute a 
balanced budget. Second, we could plan and execute the 
“right” amount of deficits or surplus necessary to avoid infla 
tion on the one hand and recession on the other. Third, we 
could allow budgets to run surpluses and deficits more or less 
passively as a result of movements in the business cycle. The 
first choice would involve no increases or decreases in Govern 
ment debt but would tend to intensify the ups and downs of 
the spending-income stream, the pattern of “boom and bust.” 
The second policy would from time to time involve possibly 
large increases in Government debt, and at times decreases as 
well. It would also have maximum smoothing effects on the 
business cycle and promote economic growth. The third policy, 
which is a compromise, would involve less changes in Govern 
ment debt than under policy two, but would also have a more 
limited stabilizing effect. It is the third policy which the 
United States has followed in the postwar period.
What About the Debt?
The result of deficit spending whether public or private is, 
of course, increased debt. Though the Practical Man may con 
cede that he himself has done pretty well since the war in 
spite of Government deficits, he is uneasy about the Govern 
ment debt. While the precise nature of the disasters which 
threaten has not been clearly explained, it is possible to identify 
and list a number of specific misfortunes, disadvantages, or 
problems which such a debt is regarded as likely to entail. Let 
us consider seven of the comments or questions which are 
frequently heard.
1. The Government debt is a growing burden. As noted 
earlier the concept of a Government debt skyrocketing out of 
control is pure folklore. The facts simply do not support it. 
The amounts of public and private debt in 1946 and 1962 to 
gether with percentage increases appear in Table 1. For com 
parison the table also includes debt figures for a familiar pri 
vate enterprise, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
and for a familiar industry, commercial banking.
Table 1 shows that since the war Federal net debt has in-
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creased hardly at all by comparison with private debt. More 
over we should recognize that the burden of a debt of a given 
size means little except in comparison with the income of the 
debtor. The first column showing gross national product for 
the two years enables us to view the growth of debt against 
debt bearing capacity. In the third column we note that net 
Federal debt which represented 109 percent of gross national 
product in 1946 had fallen to 46 percent by 1962. Chart 2 shows 
the movement of net Federal debt as a percent of gross na 
tional product from 1939 to the present time.
CHART n
FEDERAL DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC AS A PERCENT OF 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1962
PERCENT
From Chart 2 it is apparent that our Federal debt did indeed 
skyrocket during World War II, but that since that time it has 
come to represent a smaller and smaller proportion of GNP 
as income has grown more rapidly than the debt. We see that
e debt now bears about the same relation to national income 
as it did before the war.
2. Our children will inherit a burden of Government debt.
1 e sun which Galileo’s churchmen saw rising in the East 
it seems pretty clear on this point that we see what we see.
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A man does not have to be an economist to know that within 
twenty years or so a child born today will have to pay taxes 
to cover the interest on a Government debt incurred by his 
parents and grandparents. The facts are clear but how should 
we interpret them?
Our Government debt, like our much larger private debt, 
is for the most part internally held. It is owed to Americans 
and not to foreigners. Moreover our national balance sheet like 
all balance sheets has two sides, assets as well as liabilities. 
We could argue that Americans are the poorest people in the 
world because they owe the biggest Government debt. (They 
do!) Or we could argue that they are the richest people in the 
world because they own the major portion of the world’s 
soundest financial asset, the United States Government bond. 
The latter statement taken by itself can hardly be regarded as 
a logically valid argument for issuing more Government bonds. 
But neither is the former a valid argument against Govern 
ment debt. Either position taken alone makes nonsense because 
each taken alone ignores the other side of the balance sheet. 
We need both sides. Americans are suffering from a nervous 
anxiety which for want of any other term we might call “bal 
ance sheet ambivalence.” The fact is that our children will owe 
the debt to themselves and in this sense it will make them 
neither richer nor poorer.
But what about the interest on the debt? Will it not be a 
burden on future as well as present taxpayers? How can the 
next generation feel that they are getting any real benefit 
from the income on their Government bonds when it is they 
who must provide the tax money to pay the interest? Again 
the facts are undeniable. But consider an exact analogy. The 
same generation of children who inherit the Government bonds 
will also receive a vastly greater heritage of securities of 
private business corporations. The revenues from which those 
corporations will pay interest and dividends can come omy 
from sales to the generation of Americans living at that time. 
Will that generation then feel that the income from their busi 
ness securities is also a spurious gain because it is they who 
must provide the funds necessary to pay it? By precisely iden 
tical logic the owner of General Motors securities should avoid
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purchase of a Chevrolet lest he find himself paying his own 
investment income.
This is not to say that there is no possible way in which pub 
licly owned Government debt may represent a burden. Since 
ownership of bonds is not likely to be distributed among the 
people in exactly the same pattern as tax collections it is some 
times pointed out that the income on Government securities in 
volves a redistribution of income. But it should be recognized 
that ownership of private securities causes exactly the same 
kind of redistribution, though on a much larger scale owing to 
the far greater volume of such securities. This follows from 
the fact that most of the income from corporate securities is 
paid to a very small proportion of the total population who as 
customers of American business provide all of its revenues.
3. The Government debt causes inflation. Inflation means a 
rising price level and this has usually been caused by increases 
in the spending-income stream at a more rapid rate than the 
rate at which additional goods could be made available. In the 
economist’s terminology demand exceeds supply. With money 
demand increasing faster than businesses are able to increase 
the real supply of goods, price tags are marked up. A bit of 
reflection on the role of debt in our national income models 
makes clear that there is no direct connection between the 
size of the debt and the level or volume of spending. It is the 
rate of increase in the size of debt that counts, since it is only 
new deficits and debt which add to the spending stream. With 
exceptions to be noted in a moment, once debt has been created, 
it has no direct bearing whatever on the volume of spending. 
Its main effect on spending flows not from its existence but 
rather from the process by which it is created. This is amply 
clear in both models. It should also be clear that in this respect 
Government debt is no different from private debt. So long as 
they are financed in the same way each adds equally to the 
spending stream. Since World War II by far the greatest addi 
tions to our money supply have come from bank loans to pri 
vate borrowers.
However, we must note certain ways in which existence of 
Government debt may be inflationary. In the first place own 
ership of large amounts of Government bonds, like ownership
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of any other assets, tends to make people feel richer and may 
cause them to spend more out of current incomes than they 
would in the absence of such assets. But Government bonds 
are no different from other financial assets in this respect and 
of course, represent a relatively smaller amount.
Government bonds also may have inflationary effects if 
people turn them in to the Treasury for cash. Since such action 
by the holders of $48 billion in non-marketable U.S. Savings 
bonds would involve losses to the holders, a mass movement of 
this kind might be expected only if people anticipate severe 
inflation which would cause even greater losses in the real 
value of the bonds. But this did not occur on a large scale 
even in the late 1940’s — a period when inflation was at its 
worst.
Sale of marketable Government bonds held by the public 
would provide new money to add to the spending stream only 
if the bonds were bought by banks. Otherwise though the 
seller of the bond has more money, the buyer has less. But 
banks are under strict control in this respect. Like any other 
business they acquire assets by incurring debts. We call their 
debts our deposits (our “money”). Banks can go on acquiring 
all the earning assets which they desire simply by issuing de 
posit slips to the sellers, subject only to the restriction that a 
certain minimum proportion of their assets must be in the 
form of currency in their vaults or deposits at Federal Reserve 
Banks. These are the banks’ reserves and are expressed as a 
percentage of their deposit liabilities rather than of their 
assets. But since Federal Reserve Banks are also able to in 
crease and decrease their deposit liabilities (the reserves of 
the banks) by the same process of buying and selling assets, 
they have complete control over the reserves of the banking 
system and hence over the banks’ power to create new deposits. 
Member bank reserves, which are subject to 24 hour surveil 
lance by the Federal Reserve System, are the most carefully 
and continuously managed magnitude in our American finan 
cial system and, in this case, the power of control is absolute, 
though not without restraints.
Incidentally, this manner of describing the operations of 
banks in terms of their balance sheets serves to impress upon us
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the complete pervasiveness of the debt structure which under 
lies our entire financial system, even what we call our “mon 
ey. In our daily life we tend to think of “money” as something 
final and ultimate, underlying all. If we owe a debt what we 
owe is “money.” Money seems to be the foundation of debt. 
Actually, the exact opposite is the case. Money rests almost 
wholly on debt and this was just as true in Grandpa’s day as 
it is now. As with Government debt we get the true picture 
only if we look at both sides of the balance sheets. We all have 
our basic money assets “deposited” in banks and against these 
deposits the banks keep assets. But banks’ “assets” are the 
debts of others! To be sure, a fraction of bank assets are in the 
form of deposits at Federal Reserve Banks. But these bank 
assets are in turn debts of the Federal Reserve Banks, whose 
assets in turn are mainly debts of the Federal Government. 
When we ask for “cash” we get mainly Federal Reserve notes 
which are debts of the Reserve Banks based as before on their 
“assets” in the form of Government debt. Relatively speaking, 
the actual amount of gold underlying all this fantastic pyramid 
is minuscule. However, for those who view all this simply as 
confirmation of their fear that the country is going to the 
dogs, it may be pointed out that our money still has vastly 
more gold “backing” than Grandpa’s money ever had.
Failure to understand the debt origins of money sometimes 
leads to absurdly inconsistent attitudes. For example, at the 
end of World War II the American people were greatly pleased 
with their fat, new bank accounts, businessmen rejoiced in the 
resulting steady stream of eager, well-heeled customers, and 
newspapers from time to time proudly announced that bank 
deposits in their communities had reached new record highs. 
Yet the editorial pages of these same newspapers counseled 
sober reflection on the alarming increase in Government debt.
The fact is that virtually all of the delightful new deposits 
were created when the banks gave deposit slips to the United 
States Treasury in exchange for Government bonds. Banks 
were able to increase their deposit indebtedness in this way be 
cause the Federal Reserve System had provided them with the 
necessary reserves by increasing its deposit debts to them 
(their reserves). Once the necessary bank reserves had been
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provided, the banks and the Treasury simply traded debts. 
Each gave its own debt in exchange for the debt of the other. 
The Treasury received deposit debts of banks with which it 
could pay for the war and the banks received interest bearing 
Government debt. When the Treasury wrote checks to buy 
war materials ownership of the new deposits was transferred 
to the people. The banks then owed the deposit debts to the 
people instead of to the Treasury. Though the people were 
happy about these newly acquired bank deposits—their new 
“money”—they were extremely critical of the consequent in 
crease in Government debt. They did not realize that in con 
demning the Government debt they were condemning the 
source of the blessing! It was another case of balance sheet 
ambivalence.
As another possible source of inflation it is also conceivable 
that in the course of the continuous weekly refunding of short 
term Government debt, buyers might refuse to repurchase 
bonds and instead demand cash, simply by allowing their 
bonds to run off at maturity. In such a case the Treasury would 
have no alternative but to sell the new bonds to banks to whom 
the Federal Reserve would be obliged to furnish the necessary 
reserves as it did in World War II. While this eventuality is 
technically possible reflection reveals that when we speak of 
buyers refusing to repurchase bonds what we are really talking 
about is higgling over price (yield). Since there is no question 
of the solvency of the borrower (he can print his own money!), 
the only question relates to the interest rate. If the Treasury 
has trouble selling bonds to non-bank buyers at a given rate 
of interest, it could presumably find such buyers at some 
higher rate. In other words, higher interest rates are a weapon 
available for use against inflation and may have to be used 
from time to time.
The fundamental relationship of inflation to debt creation 
is implicit in our models and it boils down to this: If additional 
deficits (and debt) are incurred only when total spending is 
inadequate by definition (i.e., some previously agreed upon 
level of unemployment) we can never get too much spending 
by incurring deficits. In other words, when the need for stimu 
lation is eliminated, the stimulation is eliminated.
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4. When will this huge Government debt ever be repaid? 
Here is another situation where we see what we seem to see 
only if we insist on applying to nations or institutions rules 
appropriate for an individual or a household. And, of course, 
the same rules do not apply. While it is true that every per 
son must some day pay all of his debts, and every debt instru 
ment must be settled on its maturity date, a bit of observation 
makes clear that these rules afford little insight into man 
agement of the total debt of non-mortal institutions, whether 
public or private. Every individual some day dies and his cred 
itors expect settlement by that date. For him the trumpet 
sounds and accounts must be settled. But what about AT&T? 
What about the banks of our country? What about the private 
debt? From Table 1 we see that like those of Government, 
private debts have also grown. When will they be paid off? 
To be sure, the individual creditor of AT&T gets his money 
whenever a particular instrument matures, and any individual 
depositor can have his money from the banks on demand. But 
this is also true of Government debt. The Federal Government 
refunds maturing debt each week, and every month pays off 
in this way literally billions of dollars in individual claims, 
just as the banks do. Moreover, as far as any individual owner 
is concerned a Government bond is the nearest thing in the 
world to cash. He can always sell it to another individual.
Thus we see that in these respects Government debt is not 
materially different from private debts. Business debts and 
bank deposits have been growing as long as our country has 
grown. Expanding debts are a sign of economic health. If a 
man could return a hundred years from now it is a pretty safe 
bet that he would find AT&T, the banks, Government, and 
business in general with debts that would make present levels 
look small indeed unless, of course, our country stops growing. 
And so if we ask, “When will the directors of AT&T become 
uneasy and at last decide to pay off their ‘bloating debt’?” “On 
what cataclysmic day will the banks pay off their depositors?” 
“When will this huge Government debt ever be repaid?”, the 
answer is unmistakable and clear: “When Gabriel blows his 
horn.”
5. We face national bankruptcy. Although this statement is
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frequently heard, the meaning as applied to Government is 
not clear. Since “bankruptcy” refers to a legal process which 
can have no meaning where Government is concerned, those 
who use the term must have in mind “insolvency.” Webster 
defines “insolvent” as “unable to pay one’s debts.” But on 
reflection it becomes clear that this situation is quite inconceiv 
able for a debtor which can print its own money at will. Gov 
ernment does this whenever it borrows from the banks. In what 
sense, then, could a Government possibly become bankrupt or 
insolvent?
Evidently, since Government can print any amount of money 
it wants, it would become insolvent or bankrupt in a meaning 
ful sense only if it printed so much money or incurred so much 
debt in terms of that money that the public would be unwilling, 
or less willing, to hold either the money or the bonded debt. 
The general price level therefore affords a test of the sound 
ness of money and the interest rate a test of the soundness 
of debt. If the price level rises rapidly it usually means that 
there is too much money and it also almost certainly indicates 
that because people are losing confidence in it they are getting 
rid of it (spending it) about as fast as they can. Since the 
modern method of “printing money” is to sell bonds to banks, 
the interest rate affords a running evaluation of its effects. 
Rapidly rising prices and interest rates on Government debt 
are the sure signs that deficits, spending, and debt are increas 
ing more rapidly than available output of goods and services. 
Rising prices mean that demand exceeds supply. You then 
have “overemployment”! But increased demand is desirable 
only when idle productive capacity makes increased supply 
possible. Policies designed to stimulate spending through in 
creased deficits and debts, either public or private, are appro 
priate only when necessary to counter unemployment and 
deflation. At such times increases in demand can be matched 
by increases in supply and prices need not rise. Rising prices 
provide the signal that demand is outrunning supply. Only in 
time of war, when other considerations become paramount, 
would it be defensible to continue money and debt creation 
even in the face of the danger signals afforded by rising price 
levels and interest rates. With an enlightened electorate it could
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not happen otherwise. Meanwhile it is hardly logical to argue 
that increased spending (demand) should not be undertaken to 
restore inadequate spending (demand) for fear we might go 
too far and get too much spending (demand). This is tanta 
mount to the argument that a starving man should not seek 
more adequate food supplies because of the risk that he might 
then suffer from overeating.
6. You can’t run a business that way. This one need not now 
detain us very long. It is obvious from the facts presented in 
Table 1 that this is indeed the way you do run any growing, 
successful business. In fact we may add that a business that 
is not run that way is not likely to be around very long. The 
case of Montgomery Ward, which is still trying to recover 
from its budget-balancing, debt-avoidance policies of the 1940’s 
and early 1950’s, is perhaps an example worth considering.
7. A big Government debt frightens and discourages private 
business. The fear element and its effect on profit expecta 
tions is one which cannot be overlooked. To the extent that 
the public believes that Government spending and debt may 
lead to national bankruptcy and disaster, a real barrier to 
development exists. Even if dangers are imaginary they have 
harmful effects if they deter spending decisions. America’s 
fears of deficits and debt could keep the country from carry 
ing out production programs of which it is fully capable. World 
War II provided one of the most dramatic examples of this. 
The so-called “production miracles” of the war period would 
have been quite possible at any time during the depressed 
1930’s had the nation been willing to create and spend the 
money to provide the necessary demand. Not until the appear 
ance at Pearl Harbor of an enemy which seemed more dan 
gerous than Government debt did the American people feel 
free to loose the spending power necessary to bring into action 
the production capacity that had been there all the time. Bonds 
bought by banks which were supplied with additional reserves 
for the purpose enabled the Government to create huge sums 
of new money which it used to call forth the “production mir 
acles.” When the war ended the people found themselves in 
possession of this vastly increased money supply which they 
then proceeded to spend for things they had been wanting for
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a long time. The money created during the war is still with 
us and has provided the basic spending foundation for a period 
of prosperity which up until the slowdown in recent years was 
the greatest in the nation’s history.
The point which we must recognize here is that there is no 
special economic magic in war as such. It is the spending for 
war which provides the economic effects and war happened 
to be the only project for which people deemed such public 
spending justifiable. It is a simple matter of national balance 
sheet and income analysis to demonstrate that the spending- 
income and money supply effect would have been exactly the 
same if the project had been that of building highways, streets, 
schools, parks, research facilities, and free university educa 
tion. However, if people believe that money and debt created 
for such purposes are somehow tainted and that a day of 
reckoning awaits a nation which conducts such activities for 
any purpose except war, it is quite possible that we may again 
hold back from achievements well within our power. Mean 
while, the Russians, hampered by no such folklore or public 
guilt complex, continue each year to increase their production 
by the full amount which their actual physical capability per 
mits. As a result, while American steel and other basic industry 
has often operated well below capacity in recent years, our 
principal enemy has used all of his powers to steadily close the 
gap between us. Nobody there seems to worry much about 
national bankruptcy.
In concluding our analysis of Government debt the follow 
ing comments by a knowledgeable observer may serve to 
broaden our perspective:
At every stage in the growth of that debt the nation has set up 
the same cry of anguish and despair. At every stage in the 
growth of that debt it has been seriously asserted by wise men 
that bankruptcy and ruin were at hand. Yet still the debt went 
on growing; and still bankruptcy and ruin were as remote as 
ever . . .
The prophets of evil were under a double delusion. They erron 
eously imagined that there was an exact analogy between the 
case of an individual who is in debt to another individual and 
the case of a society which is in debt to a part of itself . . . They 
made no allowance for the effect produced by the incessant 
progress of every experimental science, and by the incessant
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efforts of every man to get on in life. They saw that the debt 
grew; and they forgot that other things grew as well as the 
debt.
The words are familiar. The problem is not new. The “pro 
phets of evil,” like Henny Penny, have been with us for a long 
time. Although the situation described here bears a startling 
similarity to American experience during the last thirty years, 
the writer did not have us in mind. He was referring to another 
great nation whose Government at the time he wrote had been 
engaged in more or less continuous deficit spending for over 
150 years during which that nation achieved an unchallenged 
position as the greatest economic power the world had ever 
known. The nation was Great Britain, the writer was the great 
English scholar and historian, Thomas Babington Macaulay, 
and the year was 1850!7
Deficit Spending: Public or Private?
As indicated in our Introduction, the logic of national income 
accounting by no means requires Government deficit spending 
for the maintenance of full employment. It only requires that 
somebody must have deficits at least large enough to absorb 
planned surpluses. We note in our models that everything ran 
smoothly enough as long as profit prospects were assumed to 
be sufficiently favorable to call forth the necessary private 
deficits. It is here that the Practical Man may enter an objec 
tion consistent both with his value judgments and with na 
tional accounting principles. Here he at last has a chance of 
bringing down a bird. To be sure, he has not failed to point 
out that profits are often inadequate, but he has failed to 
connect this fact with the relevant national income framework, 
and his explanation of why they are inadequate is not always 
fully convincing. Our Practical Man argues that profit pros 
pects have led to inadequate private investment because of 
anti-business attitudes and policies of Government. At the 
same time he insists that the Government balance its budget 
at all times. In fact, he regards an unbalanced budget as one
Bliss Perry, editor, Little Masterpieces, by Lord Macaulay. New York: 
Doubleday & McClure Co., 1898, pp. 192, 198-199.
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of the anti-business discouragements. The stock market col 
lapse as a reaction to President Kennedy’s steel price interven 
tion has frequently been cited as another example of the harm 
ful effects of government policy. (The latter argument inci 
dentally overlooks the fact that the stock market collapse was 
world wide and, except in France, considerably worse in 
Europe than in America.) The logically consistent argument 
which is possible here is that, if Government would only leave i 
business alone, private deficits spurred by adequate profit 
would insure the private spending necessary for full employ- j 
ment. Government deficits would then be unnecessary. This 
is essentially the position of a substantial proportion of the 
business community and of thorough-going Conservatives. 
There is no rigorous disproof available to rebut this position, 
particularly since we are talking about the future in which all 
things are possible. But-we can attempt to assess the probabili 
ties, as contrasted with the possibilities, which are suggested 
by past experience. On the basis of such probabilities we can 
then consider the implications of a rigorously balanced budget 
for the future.
The argument that government anti-business attitudes and 
policies account for inadequate aggregate demand may have 
a certain persuasiveness and perhaps real substance when 
applied to a period of stagnation in which we simply have a 
generally sluggish and hesitant economy. As noted above, it 
is not necessary that a Kennedy or a Roosevelt actually intend 
to conduct a campaign against business. It is enough if busi 
nessmen believe it. But what about the periodic ups and downs 
which we call the business cycle? These movements long 
antedate both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Kennedy. How do we 
account for the decline under President Eisenhower in 1958, 
or, still more difficult, the far worse decline under President 
Hoover from 1929 to 1933? Was President Eisenhower anti 
business too? Was President Hoover even more so? The record 
of history is that such movements have occurred in the past 
regardless of what government did. It is a reasonable proba 
bility that they will occur again. This being the case, how 
can we test the Conservative position? It could not be tested 
with a Kennedy or an Eisenhower, nor indeed with a Hoover,
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since, as we have noted, Mr. Hoover’s administration accepted 
very substantial passive deficits. To test it, we should be 
obliged to elect to the White House an uncompromising man 
of stern Puritan principle and also give him a Congress of 
like conviction. Only under such leadership in a severe reces 
sion could we subject to the ultimate test of experience the 
novel economic theory that the remedy for inadequate spend 
ing is reduced spending. Such an experiment is not likely to 
be attempted for the simple reason that the leaders of both 
major political parties are fully aware of the probable influence 
that it would have on the outcome of the next few dozen 
national elections.
Program for the Practical Man
It is possible to identify three kinds of situations in which 
modification or extension of present policies might reasonably 
be expected to improve future prospects for profitable private 
economic development and investment, thereby reducing the 
need for Government deficit spending. In some of the situa 
tions, the Practical Man might support revision of present busi 
ness policies; in others he could support public policies which 
in the long run would tend to increase private business activity.
I. Private policies based on market power.
1. Although we profess to believe in free, competitive mar 
kets and have laws against monopoly, substantial sectors of 
American industry have sufficient market power to hold prices 
at levels which enable them to achieve predetermined profit 
targets even when operating far below capacity. Whether, 
anticipating stagnant demand, management sets high prices in 
expectation of the high costs consequent upon low level utiliza 
tion of capacity, or whether, by setting the high prices, man 
agement causes the stagnation of demand is a hen-egg puzzle 
that cannot be solved here. In either case more price competi 
tion would lead to fuller utilization of capacity and to lower 
unit costs. It was this philosophy which guided the first Henry 
Ford and on which our anti-trust laws are based. But, as every 
TV viewer and magazine reader knows, American industry
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appears to prefer any kind of competition to price competition. 
In this area of fundamental policy making our Practical Man 
is in the driver’s seat. Only he can make the change.
2. Labor unions often tend to look at hourly wage rates 
rather than total wage bills. Even though a higher wage rate 
may lead to unemployment of some workers or prevent entry 
of additional workers by discouraging expansion of the indus 
try or by speeding up automation, union leadership usually 
prefers to have higher wages and less employment than lower 
wages and a higher level of employment. Technological im 
provements are sometimes opposed, or at least after their 
introduction “feather-bedding” strongly resists any elimination 
of displaced jobs. The inhibiting effect of such policies on prof 
its, economic growth, and wider job opportunities is obvious. 
To the Practical Man’s credit it must be recognized that he 
has not failed to identify and oppose these practices.
3. Market power has been used to escape consumer sov 
ereignty over design and style. It has been widely claimed 
that American industry, particularly in highly concentrated 
areas like automobiles, in dictating to the captive domestic 
customer has not made the most of sales opportunities in the 
foreign market. Those who seek to make this point do not 
emphasize price but argue that, since so large a part of our 
manufacturing market is at home, our manufacturers have 
not made adequate efforts in design, styling, and sales pro 
motion to meet foreign competition in foreign markets. Abroad 
one notices less emphasis on advertising and product differen 
tiation and less reluctance to mention price. Whatever may be 
the facts relating to our foreign markets, this is probably a fair 
description of what happened in the automobile industry in the 
late 1950’s. American automobile manufacturers modified de 
sign, size, and style and turned to compacts only when foreign 
competition forced it.
II. Public policies based on the idea that higher prices and 
reduced output represent the best remedy for inadequate 
demand.
1. Agricultural price supports and output restrictions raise 
the cost of food and other farm products, thereby raising con-
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sumer cost of living and affording huge windfalls to wealthy 
farmers without greatly aiding poor farmers whom the pro 
gram is mainly intended to help. The economy has thus been 
denied much of the benefit of the great agricultural productiv 
ity gains of recent decades. At the same time, by failing to con 
centrate attention on the large numbers of farmers at the lower 
end of the income scale, the program tends to put off solution 
of the underlying problem of too many people on farms. The 
Practical Man has not given us much help on this one. In fact 
in the agricultural industry itself differences of opinion among 
the people involved have so far effectively blocked a solution 
to the problem. Controversy over the recent wheat referendum 
affords a familiar example.
2. Various Government policies both at Federal and state 
levels are designed to limit competition and to maintain price 
at the expense of volume. Among these one may list (a) oil 
and other import quotas, (b) tariff exceptions for the benefit 
of industries which operate under especially severe disadvan 
tages in their efforts to meet consumer needs at prices compar 
able with available foreign sources, (c) Fair Trade laws, (d) 
transportation rates and regulations limiting competition 
among carriers, (e) state oil production controls which limit 
output of efficient producers but which allow drilling of any 
number of new wells the output of which will also be re 
stricted, (f) state milk control and similar boards. In all of 
these cases our Practical Man, representing this or that par 
ticular industry, has been the principal offender. In almost 
every instance Government has intervened to restrict the free 
dom of private enterprise for the benefit of a particular group 
and has done so at the request of the private enterprisers them 
selves. While vigorously condemning all restrictions on free 
enterprise for the benefit of others, each industry defends with 
equal vigor the restrictions imposed on others for its own 
benefit.
III. Public activities now unprofitable for private enterprise 
but likely to provide opportunities for profitable private 
investment in the long run.
1. Research and development in industrial uses of atomic
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energy, space travel and communication, production of fresh 
water from the sea, and certain education programs are exam 
ples of activities in which the pioneering must be done by Gov 
ernment for the simple reason that they are not profitable for 
private enterprise at this stage. Once the ground work has been 
laid free enterprise may move in. Private industry is already 
moving into the generation of electricity by atomic energy and : 
AT&T’s Telstar program has captured the imagination of the 
world. (We can just imagine what AT&T’s debt will look like in 
another twenty years!) Granting the prospect for increasing < 
importance of training and education in the future, and re- : 
membering the spectacular benefits which the nation now 
enjoys from the massive postwar investment in human capital 
under the G.I. Bill of Rights, the potential of the public educa 
tion contribution should be clear. We also have the example 
of America’s world leadership in agricultural techniques, 
mainly the result of Government-financed research. These are 
all activities which no private firm could have afforded to con 
duct, at least not in time to keep America ahead of her rivals 
and enemies. Since the Practical Man will obviously benefit 
from such programs in the long run, would he not be wise to 
give them his support?
2. Aid to undeveloped countries, especially in education, can 
yield immeasurable benefits in the long run. We need to look 
ahead a century or so and overlook such short-run, inconse 
quential matters as whether the individuals who happen to be 
alive today hate us or love us, are “grateful” for aid, or “follow 
our line.” How many popularity contests could the English have 
won in our country during the fifty years after Lexington and 
Concord? Looking to the long run future with historical per 
spective the development of our relations with the emergent 
nations clearly takes on a crucial aspect. Together with our 
allies in Western Europe we represent probably less than one- 
sixth of the human race. Unless we believe that intellectual 
capacity is a monopoly held by one race of men this means 
that five-sixths of the best brain power, which is what will 
count in the future, is outside our sphere. When these people 
achieve development, as they will, they will represent the 
greatest market, and by far the greatest source of human capi-
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tal in the world. How fortunate it would be for us at that time 
if development of their cultural values and trade, the orienta 
tion of their learning, the very evolution of their languages, 
would continue to find their external influences mainly in the 
Western World and especially in America. Today virtually all 
of these nations conduct their courts, parliaments, and univer 
sities in European languages, usually English. Here in lan 
guage is a vital channel of communication which tends to be 
denied to the Russians and Chinese in direct proportion as 
we continue to use it through education and other contacts. 
To discontinue such activities through pique or misguided 
“economy” is simply to leave the future to the Russians and 
Chinese.
Government activities such as those listed under III need 
not be conducted by deficit spending, though of course they 
afford outlets for deficit spending at times when the stimulus 
is appropriate. In the long run, by stimulating profitable 
opportunities for private business investment, they should 
minimize the need for Government deficit spending.
Concluding Observations
Various programs along the lines outlined above should tend 
to make our free enterprise system more viable in the long run. 
But meanwhile we are still faced with the problem of the 
business cycle with its intermittent periods of insufficient 
spending and inadequate demand. The reader who has come 
this far may now ask, “Why all the public acrimony? Why so 
much fuss? Isn’t the picture fairly clear?”
To be sure, from the viewpoint of the professional economist 
or accountant the situation is clear enough. Indeed it is obvi 
ous. In terms of accounting identities adequate deficit spend 
ing and adequate debt creation are simply the source of ade 
quate demand (adequate sales volume!). In fact we can readily 
outline the highlights of modern economic history without any 
more data than annual statistics of the nation’s total debt. 
When debt grows at a satisfactory rate we find prosperity; 
when it grows slowly we find recession; and when it actually 
declines we encounter deep depression and chaos. There is no
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doubt about this. It is the record of history. And we have now 
seen why it is so. After we have done all we can to encourage 
private spending the only remaining question of policy is this: 
When private deficits are inadequate should we choose to fill 
the gap with public deficits or should we choose unemploy 
ment? If another choice exists it has not been identified.
And so the puzzle persists. Why all the misunderstanding? 
We are obliged to go back more than a century and a half to 
find a parallel. The split between professional economists 
and the general public on the issue of free trade probably 
affords the best comparison. From the very birth of the Repub 
lic this issue was a source of bitter controversy. Although a 
civil war was fought over it, that war did not settle it. Not 
until 1962 could we say that virtually all responsible groups 
in the nation had more or less officially come to accept what 
economists had been pointing out ever since the days of Adam 
Smith. Perhaps it is also worth noting that even the free trade 
case was not nearly so clear cut as the deficit spending case. 
For in the free trade case it is possible to identify producer 
interests which are indeed different from consumer interests, 
at least, in the short run. In the deficit spending case there is 
no such conflict of interest. When demand is inadequate and 
depression develops every one suffers. The nation suffers. 
When demand is adequate the entire economy blooms.
It is precisely at this point that the economist himself encoun 
ters a puzzle. How can the principal beneficiaries of appropri 
ately timed Government deficits also be the chief opponents of 
this policy? For who has more to gain from good business than 
a business man, and who has more to lose when business is 
bad? It is a well known fact that the initial impact of recession 
is always on profits. Profit is the volatile element in national 
income and is always the first to melt away when demand 
becomes inadequate. No matter how industrious and competent 
they may be, enterprisers as a group find that the cards are 
hopelessly stacked against them when aggregate demand is 
on the decline. Business cannot sell unless the customers buy.
Perhaps one reason why the Practical Man has opposed poli 
cies beneficial to business is that he has not looked at the whole 
picture. This was obviously the case after World War II when
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he rejoiced in his growing bank account but deplored the 
growing Government debt which produced it. But the econo 
mist must also bear some of the blame. He has rarely seemed 
able to explain the mysteries of money, debt, and income crea 
tion in terms understandable to the general public. And in spite 
of the fact that every economics textbook of the past fifteen 
years has sought to explain in painful detail the principles out 
lined in this article, university economists can scarcely claim 
to have sent their students away with a crystal clear picture 
of how our money system operates. Probably neither the Prac 
tical Man nor the economist can take much credit in the public 
debate which has occurred. In fact there has been little genuine 
debate because there has been so little communication. The 
Practical Man and the press have tended to pontificate about 
technical matters which they have not understood clearly; 
while the economist on his part has frequently shown little 
patience or forebearance and has seldom devoted much time 
to the improvement of public understanding. Yet the problem 
is crucially important to the success of our democracy. The 
issues need to be clearly defined, the assumptions explicitly 
stated, and the discussion conducted with a degree of ojectivity 
not achieved up to now. Meanwhile we might reflect on the 
comment which Professor A. C. Pigou made forty years ago in 
connection with the free trade issue: “There is indeed a long 
time lag between the attainment of knowledge in economic 
affairs and its entry into the halls of authority.”

